Public policy by whim? Qatar University to teach in Arabic 6, February 2012
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.Tags: Qatar University, Qatar University arabic language, Qatar University to teach in Arabic, Rule by Whim
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Qatar’s Supreme Education Council has announced that Arabic should be the official teaching language of Qatar University. This means that most courses in the Faculty of Law, International Studies, Mass Communication and the Faculty of Management, will need to be taught in Arabic from Fall 2012.
Whatever you think about this decision, it is border-line ridiculous to impose this and give the Departments only nine months to change their curriculum, their staffing levels not to mention the mundane but critical issues such as the books. Indeed, of course, this is impossible and there is little chance that a coherent Arabic only first year can be taught in these Faculties by September.
My instant reaction is that this another example of rule by whim in Qatar. The last great example of this was when it was summarily announced that most foreigners would need to obtain their visa before arriving in Qatar: a patently stupid decision that was never going to work and of course it was soon dropped. This Arabic decision, while there are certainly reasoned arguments for QU teaching in the country’s native language, nevertheless, does not make much sense to me.
Nothing about Qatar’s overall positioning on the international stage or its outlook suggests that this is a good idea. Qatar, if it has been about anything in recent years, has been about expanding its horizons, establishing relations across the world and fostering a name for itself as something of a global citizen; seeking to use its position, its abilities and its qualities to be a world hub or intermediary be it for sports tourism, diplomacy or business. All of this suggests (to me at least) that degrees taught in English might be of more relevance.
Some basic realities:
- This will be devastating for Qatari students who want to go and study abroad. IELTS aside, what self-respecting university will accept a Qatari with a degree taught in Arabic onto, for example, an MA social studies-type course now?
- Particularly, this will hit Qatari girls the hardest. They, after all, make up the vast majority of the students at QU. Their horizons have just been diminished.
- The quality of teaching will plummet. While a sensitive topic, it is true enough to say that the teaching pedagogy in the West is light-years ahead of that in the Arab world. While this is clearly a generalization, I fully stand by it at all levels; primary, secondary and higher education. At a time when Qatar is overtly seeking to enhance its population’s education credentials to foster a knowledge economy, this is an ill-conceived move.
Had there been a reasoned debate about this issue, I think it could have been a positive move. Clearly, Qatar does not want to lose its Arabic heritage and to move to ‘shore this up’, so to speak, is a sensible idea. Yet, as ever, these knee-jerk, rule by whim policy decisions are just so profoundly ill-thought out it boggles the mind.
Incorporating ever greater portions of Arabic teaching requirements into degrees over a number of years would, for example, have been a sensible path to pursue. Then, instead of entirely changing the requirements and expectations for students looking to leave school soon (and it now being far too late to do much meaningful to prepare oneself) and allowing the University time to acquire some decent staff (as opposed to its current situation where some Departments will likely need to panic-buy any and all lecturers who can speak Arabic regardless of quality) such changes could have been made, perhaps, successfully.
And has anyone thought of the impact of this policy on the Qatari job market? Sure, this will be a great move for Qataris wanting to move directly to the public sector. Yet while such skills will obviously be of use in the private sector too – you know, that place that all Gulf countries are “trying” to encourage its workers to move into – overall, this will further entrench the public sector-for-life mentality and make the transition to Qatar’s theoretical ‘new’ economy with a viable working population for a viable private sector all the more difficult to achieve.
On Inside Story et al 5, January 2012
Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations, Iran, Qatar.Tags: AP, Inside story, Inside story iran, Iran and America, Qatar Paris St Germain
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Belated seasons greetings to all as well as a happy new year.
Blog posting has been thin on the ground recently, which is most annoying. What can I say? I’ve been profoundly mugged by the realities of a new job and lament the loss of the days when I was only very busy.
Still, I’ve been spreading the good word on a range of topics in recent weeks. Here’s a selection:
On Inside Story, not exactly at my most erudite ['bits and pieces'? oy vey] but making some sense, inshallah, about Iran.
On BBC World waxing intellectually about Qatar and the Taliban office.
On Aussie radio rambling about Qatar’s history.
In the FT and AP wittering about Qatar and Paris St. Germain.
And in some random publications elucidating the finer aspects of something or other.
The Taliban and Qatar 4, January 2012
Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations, Central Asia, Qatar.Tags: America Taliban negotiations, Qatar, Taliban, Taliban office in Qatar, Why did the taliban open an office in Qatar
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After months of negotiations it has been announced that the Taliban will open a representative office in Qatar. Initially, Afghan President Karzai rejected Qatar as the location of the office and even removed the Afghan Ambassador from Qatar, accusing the Doha Government of not consulting the Afghan Government on the matter. Yet at the end of December 2011, Karzai relented, no doubt having extracted some price for his acquiescence.
No details are known about the office yet, but it is unlikely to take on the role of a Consulate or retain any significant official diplomatic capacity for many years and even then not without the explicit approval of the Government of Afghanistan, which would simply not be given under current circumstances.
The benefits
Numerous previous efforts have been launched but failed. Two of the most recent forays for peace resulted in Western allies being swindled of hundreds of thousands of dollars by a Taliban impostor in November 2010 and a similar scam led to the assassination of the lead Afghan Peace negotiator in September 2011. This event in particular was a further catalyst for the opening of this office.
Now that a Taliban base is established, if it can be staffed effectively it should enhance the chances for finding some kind of an accommodation in Afghanistan. Without the dangerous and difficult spy-games of locating Taliban spokespeople; without the pressures of the in-country dynamics of the Taliban being a furtive, fugitive organisation and with a physical and metaphorical distance from the Afghan Taliban and their associated baggage – not to mention profound ISI-Pakistani influence – hopes are that all will find negotiating easier.
Aside from causing problems for American Diplomatic Service Protection Officers, the representative office in Doha is likely to be a boon for America with negotiating made significantly easier. Indeed, the Taliban themselves will likely seek out the Americans for discussions; they want five of their comrades incarcerated in Guantanamo to be released, perhaps for the quid pro quo of the release of a captured US serviceman.
Why Qatar?
Qatar is something of a natural choice as a location for the office. The small Gulf State now has a long history of offering up its services in the name of peace. For many years it has supported peace negotiations in Darfur through funding an inexhaustible number of Sudan-Qatar flights along with unlimited hotel accommodation and facilities in Doha as well as getting deeply involved in the negotiations themselves. Also, in 2007 Qatar sought to find an accommodation between the Houthis and the Yemeni government and, with echoes of today’s decision, offered the Houthi leadership accommodation in Qatar in return for concessions.
Moreover, as a small Gulf country, Qatar clearly has no vested interests in supporting the Taliban or the Afghan Government and can be taken by both as a reasonably neutral mediator. Lastly, Qatar is also likely to be funding this entire venture, from the office itself to the numerous return flights that will be needed. Taken together these qualities and Qatar’s pedigree mean that the list of potential countries to host – and likely fund – the office was exceedingly short.
Qatar’s motivation is – as ever – to maintain its place at the centre of the world’s attention. There comes with such attention a certain safety in the glaring lights of the international scene, not something that can be scoffed at by a tiny, exceedingly rich state hemmed in by significantly larger neighbours with whom they do not have the best of relations, in a region of profound instability. More specifically, this exact role that Qatar is playing with this issue is the personification of Qatar’s recent strategy of positioning itself as the key interlocutor between the West and Muslim actors with whom the West has trouble dealing. This exact dynamic can be seen in Qatar’s recent role in Libya, where it hopes to place itself between Western states and the emerging Islamic government, after cultivating relations with, for example, Ali Al Salabi – one of Libya’s most prominent clerics – for many years. So too can one discern such a relationship with Qatar’s attempts to build and use relations with the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen.
Step towards peace
Overall, while this move is certainly a step towards brokering some kind of peace in Afghanistan, opening up far greater possibilities of meaningful interaction between all sides, it is but the first step along a long and winding road. Qatari facilitation can be exceedingly useful, but it will still take courage on all sides to take the necessary concessionary steps incumbent upon all actors seeking to close violent conflicts.
Published on RUSI.org
Qatar announces elections for 2013 1, November 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.Tags: legislative elections qatar 2013, Qatar, Qatar election, Qatar election 2013
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Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, in his annual speech to the Shura Council, has announced that Qatar will have elections for a legislative body in 2013. Though the full details of what this entails are not available at present, if this follows the Constitution, 30 of the seats will be elected and 15 will be appointed.
Long time coming
Back in 1995 when the Emir first came to power, elections for the Central Municipal council were promised. This election was to vote in the 29 members of the advisory body attached to the Ministry of Municipality and Agriculture. In late 1997, female suffrage was promised and the election was scheduled for March 1999. Amid high turnout (over 90% in Doha, 70% for the rest of Qatar) no women were elected but Qatar’s first elections with full emancipation – albeit for a consultative role – was a success.
By this stage, other elections had taken place, having taken a lead from the Emir’s enlightened position as espoused in 1995. The Qatari Chamber of Commerce, previously all appointed, was elected by secret ballot of its members in April 1998 and the Assistant Minister of Education noted in 1998 that from then on she would encourage democracy in her fiefdom with the free election of student bodies.
Full general elections for a legislative elected body was expected in 2005 then 2007 again by some in 2010.
Why?
The Emir in Qatar has announced these elections while facing no calls to do so. There is no groundswell of opinion in Qatar demanding democracy. This is a function of the strong socioeconomic position in which Qataris find themselves; the fact that they are, overall, generally pleased and proud to be Qatari, their reputation in recent years having being burnished by their government’s actions in, for example, temporarily solving the bitter Lebanese political crisis in 2008, their continued support of peace in Darfur and their unprecedented actions in Libya; and the fact that Kuwait – the Gulf’s most democratically advanced state – offers an example of how greater democracy in a Gulf context can woefully stifle and retard the efficient progress of government and economics in a country.
Internationally
Qatar has, since its transformation began in the early to mid-1990s, always seen itself as a regional leader. Again without pressure, the Emir abolished the Qatari Information Ministry soon after he came to power; established the revolutionary Al Jazeera TV station; sought to carve out a space for Qatar’s own foreign relations which included shockingly taboo deals with Israel and Iran in the late 1990s especially and generally Qatar eschewed the old, more conservative traditional policies and prodeadures of the Gulf.
This has infuriated its neighbors significantly on numerous occasions. The lack of a Saudi Ambassador in Doha from 2004 to 2008 being one example of severe neighborly displeasure.
More recently, Qatar has – so to speak – calmed down somewhat and reigned in its more egregiously provocative actions. Al Jazeera, for example, has curtailed its vociferous coverage of Saudi Arabia significantly since 2008. Yet this move is likely to antagonise its fellow GCC members. The contrast between a potentially highly democratic Qatar and, for example, Bahrain and especially Saudi Arabia are not going to be comparisons that are appreciated in Manana and Riyadh.
Real powers?
The key caveat here is to note what kind of powers these new Qatari elected officials will have. Again, if the Constitution is followed, then the body will be able to:
- Approve (not prepare) the national budget
- Institute votes of no confidence in Ministers
- Draft, discuss and vote on proposed legislation which will need a 2/3 majoirty and the Emir’s vote to pass
It remains to be seen what will happen in practice. Specifically, it will be interesting to see what kind of deference they show to the Governmental elite. In Kuwait, for example, a certain amount of deference was implicit. Yet ever more the Prime Minister, for example, who was previously untouchable, is the centre of bitter recrimations and attacks.
Initially, it would be logical to expect a certain amount of deference, but this obviously depends upon who is elected. In Kuwait, there are a number of politicians who shamelessly use their positions to grandstand and have brought the machinary of government to a halt over their deeply felt but nevertheless minor issues. While in the public life in Qatar there are certainly a couple of people who will no doubt stand for election and may well be similarly forthright and obstructive, one must not forget that Qatar is a counservative place. As happened before and though it may sound counterfactual, those whose platforms are overtly political or percieved to be at all reactionary, may well find themselves harshly dealt with by the public vote. A lot of Qataris are of the opinion that ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’, hence their lack of a call for democracy, and could well assert this notion at the ballot box.
Having said this, there are certainly a number of hot-button issues in Qatar: the educational reforms, the money being spent on Education City and Qatar’s international forays. Though political parties are banned and will likely not be allowed in the near future, there is scope for politicians – many of whom will no doubt come from an Islamic bent – to stand on conservative lines who may attempt to slow down such reforms. Such politicians will have to decide how hard to bang their electoral drum: yes, they need to appeal to voters and to show their stripes, but not too vociferously as to scare off other potential voters.
In sum, this is another fascinating move from a fascinating country. Again Qatar has seized the mantle of leadership in the Arab World and reaffirmed its place as a place of dynamism, of forward-thinking intellect and as unafraid to take some risks.
Qataris in Libya: ’100s in every region’ 26, October 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.Tags: Qatar lekhwiya, Qatar special forces, Qatar speical forces Libya, Qatar troops Libya, Qatar troops rebels, Qatari troops, Qatari troops on the ground
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The Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed forces, Major General Hamad Bin Ali Al Attiya, has confirmed for the first time that Qatar had ’100s of Qataris on the ground [in Libya] in every region.’
While this is something of an open secret having been written about for a long time now (x x), it is interesting to note that it is now confirmed. However, the fact that there were ’100s in every region’ is significantly more than most people thought.
It is likely that these forces were comprised of largely British trained Qatari Special Forces and parts of the Lekhwiya, a quasi-police outfit that does all sorts from, reportedly, training rebels in Libya, handling motorcades in Doha to directing traffic. Both the Lekhwiya and the Special Forces are reputed to be well trained.
In situ, it would be interesting to know if the Qataris were the ones doing the training themselves, or if it was the foreign instructors that trained them. I suppose it must have been a mix. The Qatari Armed Forces as a whole and like most Emirate forces, are small and rely to varying degrees on foreign soldiers within their ranks. Not only to do some of the training but to simply make up the numbers. There are, for example, many Jordanians, Yemenis and Egyptians in the Qatari military. None of these folk, incidentally, received a 120% pay raise the other month unlike their Qatari work-mates.
It is unlikely that this is the start of a new militarism in Qatari foreign policy. Sure, if another opportunity comes up where it is politically and practically feasible for Qatar to send some trainers into a conflict zone, they might do this again. Yet the chances of that do not appear to be good. Syria, for example, is a wholly different kettle of fish. From a vastly different, far smaller geography, to a significantly different political situation vis a vis the rebels and the government, to the fact that it is a critical regional tinder-box, I’d be surprised if any Qataris were rumored to be on the ground there in anything other than exceedingly small numbers, if at all.
Blowback for Qatar 25, October 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in North Africa, Qatar.Tags: Moussa Koussa, Moussa Koussa Qatar, Qatar intervention in Libya, Qatar libya, TNC Qatar
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At some stage the adulation and praise that Qatar received was always going to give way to some grumblings of one flavor or another.
Initially, Qatar was praised ad nauseum for their actions:
- First Arab state (second overall after France) to recognise the TNC
- Contributed 6 Mirage fighter jets to the NATO no fly zone mission
- Leading proponent in the GCC and the Arab League of the no-fly zone
- Sold free Libyan oil on behalf of the rebels
- Shipped gasoline and other key items to the rebels
- Shipped tonnes of weapons to the rebels
- Trained the rebels in Libya and back in Doha
- Economic aid
The first real signs of griping regarding Qatar’s role [from Libyans: I'm sure the Saudi's were moaning about their 'upstart' neighbour long ago] was last week when Al Tarhouni, Libya’s Oil and Finance Minister pointedly remarked that
To any country, I repeat, please do not give any funds or weapons to any Libyan faction without the approval of the NTC.
This was a clear message to Qatar. Since the start of the conflict, Doha has been funneling arms, money and support to Libya via its contacts there. These included Bejhaj and the Al Salibi brothers. The militias associated with these groups became exceedingly well resourced and thus prospered.Yet now that the fighting is largely over and the TNC are trying to assert their authority and begin the long and slow process of returning Libya to some state of normality, the elite are obviously concerned about cash and weapons potentially still being funneled to one particular faction over another. It is reasonable that they want control over such matters
The second issue is one that has been latent for some months. Moussa Koussa left the UK for Qatar in April. It was becoming far too difficult for him to stay in the UK given his murderous past. Now in Qatar he has, I am sure, proved exceedingly useful to the Qataris and thus indirectly to the NATO alliance in working out who is who in Libya, what Gaddafi is was likely to be up to and where he was most lilely to flee to. Plus a host of other bits and pieces that only long time close confidant of Gaddafi could know. This was the price for his residency in Qatar. Yet now – on the ball as ever – the BBC doorstepped him after after miraculously ‘tracking him down’ to the Four Seasons in Doha (it’s not like it’s been written in numerous articles, or anything x x).
It is likely that there will be a sizable push to bring Koussa to some kind of justice, perhaps in Tripoli, perhaps in the Hague. This will put Qatar in a difficult position, as it will be difficult for Qatar to give up Koussa. Not only would such a notion go against deep-seated notions in this part of the world of hosting a guest (whomever that may be) but Qatar will not want to set a precedent of cow-towing to other powers to hand over someone with whom they have had dealings. Indeed, Qatar sees itself as something of a refuge for various international misfits ranging from one of Saddam Hussein’s wifes to one of Osama Bin Laden’s sons.
Yet if Qatar does not hand over Koussa as demanded by ‘the Libyan people’ (such a demand is surely not far off) then it risks frittering away the credit that it has built up. Indeed, the TNC’s pointed remarks are already chipping away.
Overall, I don’t really think that Qatar is trying to push its Islamist allies (for that is who most of them are) because they are Islamist per se. I see Qatar’s support of Belhaj et al as mostly a factor of simple connections: they already had relations with Al Salibi and Bejhaj and thus they supported them. Certainly, Qatar is a proud, religious and conservative state and would want to support moderate Islamists, as they are doing, but it is hardly the case that they would refuse to support liberals or someone else. The fact is that if the West is expecting liberals and explicitly non-Islamist candidates to win offices after the Arab Spring, then there will be a lot of disappointed people in London and Washington.
Certainly, Qatar must take into account the TNC’s growing power and their wholly understandable and justified desire to control the weapons going in and out of their country. Yet I also detect a simple pang of jealousy as a motivating factor for the jibes against Qatar. No, I’m not trying to castigate those complaining about Qatar, just point out that it is logical for those without Qatari support to feel irked that someone else is getting truck loads of cash and arms. And if and when such people complain that they are not getting funded because Qatar are funding their own Islamists or some such notion, then I think they are being a bit cheeky and trying to pressure Qatar to stop using the wholly bust Western-created trope and specter of ‘Islamists gaining power’.
This is not to say that Qatar does not have some master plan to push one particular Islamist strand or whatever, just that I don’t know anything about such a plan and it sounds unlike the Qatar that I do know.
As for Koussa, Qatar’s best bet would either be to send him economy class to the Hague now, sticking up for justice and all that, or send him off to some tin-pot African country that wouldn’t care a jot about ICC demands. No, this is not an edifying conclusion, but this is high politics that we’re referring to, after all, not never-never land.
On Qatar in Libya 2, October 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in North Africa, Qatar.Tags: Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Qatar Libya, Libya, Qatar, Qatar's intervention in Libya
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I’ve been so horrendously busy of late that I’ve not even had time to publicize my latest article on Qatar in Foreign Affairs. Thus far it’s got a lot of good comments, so thanks to all. And a quick thanks to the editors too who made it even snappier.
Gaddafi forces capture 17 UK, French and Qatari ‘advisers’ 19, September 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in North Africa, Qatar.Tags: Allied support Libya, British soldiers captured, Gaddafi, Gaddafi forces, Gaddafi forces capture mercanries, Mercenaries captured Libya, Qatari captured
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Reuters is reporting that Gaddafi loyalists have captured 17 mercenaries, as they describe them. Most are French but there are also some from the UK, Qatar and an unspecified Asian country, the initial report notes.
These ‘mercenaries’ are in fact ‘technical experts and consultative officers’ aiding the rebels in their advance on the last pockets of Gaddafi’s troops.
If it is subsequently confirmed, this will mark a potentially significant boost for pro-Gaddafi forces and a commensurate setback for Libya’s new government and its allies, not to mention causing consternation for the UK, France and Qatar.
It could prove to be rather embarrassing and difficult for Qatar, should the reports prove to be correct. It would confirm what has been long suspected and reported on – that Qatar has boots on the ground. And a Qatari getting directly caught up in these troubles many thousands of miles away may contribute to concerns in Qatar as to the significant level of Qatari involvement in Libya.
If some accommodation can be reached, Gaddafi would surely demand a high price given his deranged mental state and his recent toppling from power. This or a rescue operation by UK or French special forces is surely the most likely (positive) outcome.
Perfect storm of a problematic article for Qatar 11, September 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.Tags: Conservatives, Homosexuality, homosexuality Qatar, old v new, Qatar
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As I’ve noted before, I was taken-aback when Qatar won the rights to host the 2022 World Cup and the question of homosexuality still being illegal in Qatar was dredged up, mostly, I think, by the angry British press. In many years of studying Qatar and reading everything written on the topic, this issue had quite simply never come up. Of course, had I given it any thought I’d have concluded that Qatar, as a conservative Muslim nation, would likely ban homosexuality and that they may well have some draconian punishment on their statute books from yonks ago, but I hardly spend my days pondering the legalities of homosexuality.
This topic, then, is something of a sensitive one for Qatar. Particularly when the full glare of the world’s press stares microscopically down on Qatar whenever some event linked to 2022 rears its head. It is a simple encapsulation of the dichotomy between liberal modernity (for want of a better description) and conservative, highly religious, transitioning countries such as Qatar.
Indeed, the whole issue of liberal and conservative politics in Doha is the third rail.
For while the elite are, I feel, pulling Qatar forward in many areas, there is a distinct pull back from society too. In education, for example, in a brazen and remarkable attempt to catapult Qatar’s education system from the 1960s to the 2010s, RAND came in and jiggled things around, changing curricula, the language of instruction and all manner of things that really rather annoyed what seems to be the majority of Qataris. Similarly in Education City boys and girls share classrooms and converse in freedom, something that is frowned upon by a far from an insignificant section of society.
In health matters, Sheikha Moza pushed for the mandatory introduction of DNA tests before marriage to stop the…umm…unfortunate custom of intermarriage in Gulf societies. To this too the age old riposte of “but we didn’t have that in our day and things worked out just fine” is just impossible for many to resist.
Indeed, in many ways Sheikha Moza is at the very forefront of this battle. Her very visible presence alongside the Emir and countless events over the years is, itself, a significant statement. I’ve spoken to many young girls in Qatar that idolize the Sheikha for this; for showing them that they can aspire and achieve what they want, yet equally I’ve spoken to many (not only gents) who see the visibility of the Sheikha as, as it has always been gently put, ‘undesirable or problematic’ for a country as traditional as Qatar.
It is a matter of potential significance if and when these kinds of issues collide, especially when they may catch the lens of the international spotlight.
The student newspaper of Cornell, one of the US universities with a campus in Qatar’s Education City, is currently kicking up a righteous fuss over the Sheikha’s patronage of a clinic that, among numerous noble pursuits, also seeks to ‘treat‘ homosexuality.
In such an instance, the Sheikha is in a bind.
I have no idea whatsoever as to her views on homosexuality, but the situation is highly delicate. Standing by the clinic could incite further protest from Cornell and add to charges laid against Qatar by the international press (those paragons of justice). Distancing herself from the clinic would likely incite further ire here in Qatar.
Though this example is only a minor story currently (wait until someone is arrested for homosexuality) it is symptomatic of some of the key difficulties that Qatar is facing: the clash of the old and the new. Not that Qatar is, of course, alone in this struggle. Indeed, the Gulf is beset with countries wrestling to join the enlightened twenty-first century (do I really need to give an example of the key country in question here?) but with Qatar so single-mindedly grabbing the full-beam attention of the world with their 2022 gambit, the pressure on them is greatest. And I repeat what I said on the day that they won the prize: they don’t have a clue what they’ve let themselves in for.
Hat tip: Doha News
Qatar wage hikes: Et tu, Qatar? 7, September 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar, Random.Tags: Qatar wages rise, Qatarisation, Qatarization
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Qatar has raised the basic salary for Government employees by 60% and for Armed Forces employees by 120%. Pensions and social allowances have also been hiked up. Qataris have the Crown Prince, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to thank for this.
It is disappointing to see Qatar follow the terrified GCC crowd on this topic. The Qatari leaders have nothing to fear from their citizens. Unlike some government in the region that need to buy them off, the Qatari elite are, generally, a popular bunch.
So why have they done this given that it will:
- Hike up inflation, which is already showing signs of being a problem.
- Arguably create the expectation in the future of similar rises as part of the basic ruled-ruler bargain, which, at some point, Qatar will not be able to afford.
- Decimate any notion of succeeding with Qatarization. Private companies will have a nightmare – more of a nightmare – in attracting well qualified Qataris if they have stratospheric pay in the public sector to compete with. Either Qataris will simply work for the public sector, that notorious bastion of efficiency, or private companies will have to hike their pay, slashing their margins and further bumping up inflation.
So why then?
- Reward for the armed forces for their involvement in the Libyan crisis. And the public sector have been rewarded with half as much because it’s difficult to give to one and not the other.
- To kill off grumblings in Qatar? Sure, some people have not been wildly happy about Qatar’s involvement in Libya while others bitterly complain about the state of roads in Doha or that Education City is a waste of money or that there’s not enough fruit in the local supermarket…of course there are grumblings, there always are. But these are – unless I’m missing something huge – not serious at all.
- The Crown Prince wants some gratitude. He gave out the cash, he will receive the plaudits. But again, he’s not an unpopular fellow and it is a potentially dangerous path to follow to link one’s popularity with wage hikes or something of this nature.
The key problem with these hikes is that they reinforce the rentier nature of Qatar. All Gulf countries are fighting the difficult battle whereby productivity and work more generally is just not related to wages. The link between the labor and the fruits thereof is bust.
Encouraging the private sector is meant to help alleviate the worst of this rentier problem. Why Qatar is so catastrophically undercutting this goal is a mystery. Methinks it is partly due to the nature of decision making in Qatar and the Gulf – at the elite level, perhaps with not that much consultation – and partly because there are no real consequences to ponder right now. The difficulty with this whole rentier question comes as oil and gas rents pare down, which is not for some time yet.
