UAE backheel penalty: tut tut 26, July 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in The Emirates.Tags: UAE penalty, UAE backheel penalty
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The clip below shows an Emirati player backheeling a penalty against Lebanon.
To those that perhaps don’t understand football culture, this is a shoddy thing to do. And it’s far worse and far more humiliating a thing to do if you’re already 6-2 up. Clearly, you’ve already wiped the floor with the opposition, to do something like this is wholly beyond the spirit of the game. Tut tut.
In any case, as any footballer will know (even a rubbish one like me), he makes a complete ass of himself doing so: it’s practically a mis-kick. If you want to see how to do this watch Totti below who did this in practice. Classy.
14% of Emiratees to vote in elections 10, July 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in The Emirates.Tags: democracy, UAE elections, UAE Federal National Council, UAE crack down, Democracy Emirates
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Around 129,000 or 14% of Emiratees will be eligible to vote in the elections on 24th September 2011 to elect half of the members of the Federal National Council.
To put this another way, only 1.6% of the entire population of the Emirates will be voting. Or, to look at this more positively, considering less than 7,000 Emiratees were eligible to vote in the last elections, clearly some progress – albeit from an absurd base – is being made.
Yet there are greater issues afoot. Not only is the Federal National Council one of the region’s most rubber stamping of rubber stamping institutions, but there are serious problems to do with freedom of expression currently plaguing the UAE, from the removal of the Gulf Research Centre to a severe crack-down on those who – politely – request more democratic freedoms. I’ll let the Economist take up the story.
Manchester City stadium renaming faux pas 9, July 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in The Emirates.Tags: Etihad Airlines, Etihad manchester city, Etihad united manchester city, Manchester city, Manchester city sponsorship, Manchester city stadium name change
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Manchester City, the English Premiere League club, have renamed their stadium the Etihad Stadium, after signing the largest sponsorship deal in history worth some £400 million pounds with Abu Dhabi’s Etihad Airlines.
All I would note is that they have quite literally renamed their stadium the ‘United Stadium’. I’m sure that this will do down fantastically well with their supporters.
Iran builds pearl roundabout monument on disputed island 5, June 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Bahrain, Iran, The Emirates.Tags: Abu Musa, Emirates Abu Musa, Iran Abu Musa, Pearl Rounda Abu Musa, Pearl roundabout
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I can’t believe that I missed this when the story first broke.
Evidently the Iranians have a super sense of high mirth and constructed a fake ‘pearl roundabout’ as a monument to the epicenter of the Bahraini protests, which was subsequently destroyed in Manama. Moreover, not only did they ironically immortalize the roundabout, but they built it on the disputed island of Abu Musa, which the Iranians nabbed from the Emirates in 1971.
Gulf Research Centre Dubai ‘restructures’ 1, June 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in The Emirates.Tags: Dubai, Gulf Research Centre, Gulf Research Centre Dubai, UAE
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There have been rumours circulating for some time now that the various think tanks based in the Emirates were coming under severe pressure from the authorities. Now there is proof.
The Gulf Research Centre based in Dubai is, as it wistfully calls it, ‘restructuring’. Its permit to operate in Dubai expired after ten years in 2010 and it has not been renewed. Clearly, they are doing something right.
This is another nail in the coffin of the liberal dream of the UAE.
Curiously, GRC is relocating its staff to Jeddah(!) and also to Geneva and Cambridge. Best of luck to them.
Qatar ‘not to benefit’ from 2022 World Cup 18, May 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar, The Emirates.Tags: Command economy, Gulf economy, Qatar economy, Qatar hotels, Qatar World Cup, Qatar world cup net benefit, world cup net benefit, Yas Island hotels
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Citigroup’s chief economist has posited that Qatar will not see any (net) economic benefit from hosting the 2022 World Cup. While this would hardly make Qatar unique, this will not come as happy reading to Qataris concerned about their inheritance being squandered on the mother of all prestige projects.
The Bloomberg article carrying this story focuses on the issue of hotel rooms. Currently, Qatar has around 60% occupancy but has pledged to increase its capacity tenfold. It is perfectly reasonable to ask, therefore, who will be staying in all these rooms after the World Cup. Sure, tourism will pick up somewhat after – inshallah – hosting a successful tournament, but 90,000 rooms? I don’t remotely see where that number of people will come from.
It is the same story in the Emirates. The large hotels on Yas Island, aside from the week per year when they are full with F1 fans and officials, generally operate at less than 10% capacity. How this can continue, I just don’t see.
All of this is a part of the voodoo economics that envelopes the Gulf. Supply and demand? Where? I just don’t really see it in the Gulf. Look at all the empty towers dotted around the region and the new soon to be empty towers currently rising beside them. It often far more resembles a Soviet-esque command economy than anything else. Sometimes this can work, at least for a time. Dubai’s ‘build it and they will come’ attitude did well until its spectacular crash; hardly a good harbinger for the region loosely following some of its principles.
The UAE’s mercenary army? 16, May 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in The Emirates.Tags: Abu Dhabi mercenary army, South African mercenaries, UAE mercenary army
7 comments
So it seems that the UAE, or more specifically, Abu Dhabi, has been cultivating mercenary armed forces in the desert. Their aim is reportedly to either quell uprisings within the Emirates, act somehow against Iran or to be first responders to a terrorist incident.
All in all it is really rather impressively poorly thought out.
- So the UAE want to rely on a bunch of paid killers for their security. People who have specialised (particularly in the South African case) in taking money and killing people at the behest of…well…anyone. What a morally bankrupt policy.
- The report notes that such an army might be a part of a plan, one day, to take back the Abu Musa and Tunb islands from Iran. What a joke. There is no way that the Emirates would be that stupid: that would be a bona fide act of war, however justified historically. And I would not want such a mission to be entrusted to a bunch of mercenaries who couldn’t give two hoots about the lumps of rock in the Gulf: if there’s a good chance you’d die (do you think the Iranians would give up without a fight, or fight fairly for that matter?) it hardly matters how much you’re being paid.
- A mercenary army unleashed against Emirati protestors? Is that what’s envisaged? This would immediately de-legitimize their mission and cause a fire-storm of protests: ‘Emiratis killed by foreign mercenaries’
- A bunch of mercenaries as first responders to a terrorist attack? What – exactly – would their rules of engagement be? What role would traditional CT forces play in this? How would they hand-over? What legal authority would they have?
- Let’s not forget how integral military forces are to the prestige of Gulf (if not most) countries and particularly to the leaders. Deploying such mercenary forces would be a monumental slap in the face for any and all Emirati forces. It clearly and brazenly states – to the world – that every last one of them is rubbish at their job; that they cannot do what they are paid and trained to do: defend their country. I think that the shock-waves of shame would reverberate around the Emirates.
Overall, then, IMHO (as the kids say), this idea…needs some thought.
Update: I’ve just updated all the typos in this article – apologies!
The $3.7 million Qatari license plate 12, April 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar, The Emirates.Tags: 1 license plate Abu Dhabi, 55555 license plate, most expensive license plate, Qatar license plate
4 comments
A Qatari man with far too much money and way too little common sense has bought Qatar’s most expensive license plate. The registration ’55555′ cost just under $4 million. I’ve never felt the urge to steal a license plate before just to inconvenience someone, now, however…
Still, I am sure that this guy feels hugely inadequate as compared to the Emirati who splashed the practically immoral sum of $14.3 million dollars for the licence plate ’1′ in 2008.
The endgame in Bahrain: Saudi and UAE troops enter Manama 15, March 2011
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, The Emirates.Tags: Bahrain, Bahrain revolution, Bahrain Saudi troops, Bahrain state of emergency, Saudi troops enter bahrain, UAE police Bahrain
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With escalating tensions and increasingly violent rioting on the streets of Bahrain’s capital, Manama, Saudi Arabia sent in troops to ‘stabilise’ the Bahraini Government. The UAE too has responded to the request from the Bahraini government to “contribute to the establishment of internal security and stability” and has sent at least 500 police.
Thus far there is no evidence that Qatar or Kuwait has taken part in this mission, though they have offered strong rhetorical and financial support for Bahrain.
The Saudi contingent is nominally part of the ‘Peninsula (Jazeera) Shield Force’, a multi-national task force of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Established in the mid-1980s to counter any potential Iranian threat, this force was soon beset with command and control issues and it is questionable if it was ever an active or effective fighting unit. By the mid-2000s it was defunct. In 2009, prompted by Yemeni incursions into Saudi Arabia, it was re-branded and re-tooled as a ‘Peninsula Shield Rapid Reaction Force’ though questions as to whether it could ever function as a genuine multi-national task-force remain.
The force’s raison d’etre has always been to preserve GCC security and unity. This explains the particular utility in using the ‘Peninsula Shield Force’ for the majority of the intervention into Bahrain; so it appears more like fraternal support based on mutually agreed common goals and identities than a heavily armed incursion to prop-up an unpopular, minority-based Royal government.
The entry of at least 1000 Saudi troops with armoured troop carriers and other assorted lightly armed vehicles plus the UAE contingent signifies a qualitative shift in the dynamics of the troubles in Bahrain. Until now there has only been stiff rhetorical and financial support from neighbouring governments.
GCC Royal families are, perhaps understandably, severely concerned about allowing any kind of republican precedent. While conditions are different in Bahrain as compared to their neighbouring states, the GCC leadership, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, appear to follow an ‘Article 5’ mandate: a threat to one Royal family is seen as tantamount to a threat to them all.
The Shia twist in Bahrain too will have contributed to their calculus. Typically, the Sunni-Shia dimension has been lazily applied as a lens to understand Bahrain’s issues. Certainly, it has been prominent, but – until recently – economic cleavages have been equally important as a delineating line in Bahraini politics. Yet the recent troubles have significantly exacerbated sectarian tensions and current Sunni-Shia relations are as bad as they have been in decades.
The key backdrop to this is the insidious notion of Iranian, Shia fifth columnists pervading Gulf States and Bahrain in particular. Certainly Iran has sporadically alluded to such threats in the past and has overtly described Bahrain as the ‘14th province of Iran’, which drew immediate and vociferous Arab denunciations. These Iranian concerns are particularly acute for Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent present in the UAE.
Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich eastern province is where the majority of Saudi Arabia’s Shia live. There are genuine and deep-rooted concerns in the Saudi government of further uprisings in these areas. On Thursday 10th March police fired into a group of Shiite protestors demanding the release of prisoners and the next day, on Saud Arabia’s ‘day of rage’, there were larger though peaceful protests in Hofuf and Qatif in the east of the Kingdom. Riyadh is highly motivated not to give these protestors any encouragement from their religious brethren nearby in Bahrain.
After Abu Dhabi bailed out Dubai from its spectacular financial collapse, it set about emasculating Dubai’s power in the federation. One result is that Dubai’s ‘perennial’ role as an Iranian-friendly port city is coming under increasing pressure from Abu Dhabi and America. The recent uncovering of an Emirati ‘spy ring’ in Oman, allegedly there to investigate Oman’s Iranian links, further propagates the notion of the Emirates as highly concerned with Iran’s activities.
For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, therefore, this intervention is a calculated risk. Immediately, opposition groups in Bahrain castigated the entry of foreign troops as “a blatant occupation” or even as “an act for war” despite official protestations that the troops are there to protect official installations. Indeed, the soldiers and police from Saudi Arabia and the UAE arrived soon after Bahrain’s financial district, the core of its economy, was closed down by protestors.
There are real concerns that this move in and of itself may escalate the violence. For while the foreign soldiers and police are nominally in Bahrain to protect critical infrastructure, any footage of them arresting, subduing or otherwise harming a Bahraini protestor would be hugely incendiary in Bahrain and similarly provocative in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. Moreover, the spectre of a proxy war in Bahrain between Saudi Arabia and Iran is apparent now that Riyadh has broken the taboo of direct intervention.
These actions further complicate an already Gordian problem for America. Thus far the reaction has been to simply note that “this is not an invasion” and Washington will surely head off any mooted Bahraini overtures at the United Nations for support. It is also worth noting that Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, was in Manama on Saturday for discussions with the Bahraini leadership, a critical US ally as the home of the US fifth fleet. The US Administration has denied that Gates was informed about this plan.
The events set in motion carry dark overtones. There is a real sense of fear that in their haste to avoid allowing a precedent to be set and to prevent any potential Iranian interference, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s actions may well precipitate these very outcomes. Ominous statements emanating from Tehran and an outraged reaction from the largely un-cooperative opposition in Bahrain, suggest that these actions have further polarised and inflamed an already highly troubled situation. The announcement of three months of martial law by the Bahraini King confirms the deeply worrying trends in Bahrain.
Aside from an ignominious withdrawal by the foreign troops and police, which would play incredibly badly in their own countries, or the dissolution of the opposition, which appears wholly unlikely, the only likely outcome is a delicate stalemate, which is liable to explode at any moment.
David B Roberts, Deputy Director RUSI Qatar


