jump to navigation

The Taliban and Qatar 4, January 2012

Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations, Central Asia, Qatar.
Tags: , , , ,
add a comment

After months of negotiations it has been announced that the Taliban will open a representative office in Qatar. Initially, Afghan President Karzai rejected Qatar as the location of the office and even removed the Afghan Ambassador from Qatar, accusing the Doha Government of not consulting the Afghan Government on the matter. Yet at the end of December 2011, Karzai relented, no doubt having extracted some price for his acquiescence.

No details are known about the office yet, but it is unlikely to take on the role of a Consulate or retain any significant official diplomatic capacity for many years and even then not without the explicit approval of the Government of Afghanistan, which would simply not be given under current circumstances.

Taliban

The benefits

Numerous previous efforts have been launched but failed. Two of the most recent forays for peace resulted in Western allies being swindled of hundreds of thousands of dollars by a Taliban impostor in November 2010 and a similar scam led to the assassination of the lead Afghan Peace negotiator in September 2011. This event in particular was a further catalyst for the opening of this office.

Now that a Taliban base is established, if it can be staffed effectively it should enhance the chances for finding some kind of an accommodation in Afghanistan. Without the dangerous and difficult spy-games of locating Taliban spokespeople; without the pressures of the in-country dynamics of the Taliban being a furtive, fugitive organisation and with a physical and metaphorical distance from the Afghan Taliban and their associated baggage – not to mention profound ISI-Pakistani influence –  hopes are that all will find negotiating easier.

Aside from causing problems for American Diplomatic Service Protection Officers, the representative office in Doha is likely to be a boon for America with negotiating made significantly easier. Indeed, the Taliban themselves will likely seek out the Americans for discussions; they want five of their comrades incarcerated in Guantanamo to be released, perhaps for the quid pro quo of the release of a captured US serviceman.

Why Qatar?

Qatar is something of a natural choice as a location for the office. The small Gulf State now has a long history of offering up its services in the name of peace. For many years it has supported peace negotiations in Darfur through funding an inexhaustible number of Sudan-Qatar flights along with unlimited hotel accommodation and facilities in Doha as well as getting deeply involved in the negotiations themselves. Also, in 2007 Qatar sought to find an accommodation between the Houthis and the Yemeni government and, with echoes of today’s decision, offered the Houthi leadership accommodation in Qatar in return for concessions.

Moreover, as a small Gulf country, Qatar clearly has no vested interests in supporting the Taliban or the Afghan Government and can be taken by both as a reasonably neutral mediator. Lastly, Qatar is also likely to be funding this entire venture, from the office itself to the numerous return flights that will be needed. Taken together these qualities and Qatar’s pedigree mean that the list of potential countries to host – and likely fund – the office was exceedingly short.

Qatar’s motivation is – as ever – to maintain its place at the centre of the world’s attention. There comes with such attention a certain safety in the glaring lights of the international scene, not something that can be scoffed at by a tiny, exceedingly rich state hemmed in by significantly larger neighbours with whom they do not have the best of relations, in a region of profound instability. More specifically, this exact role that Qatar is playing with this issue is the personification of Qatar’s recent strategy of positioning itself as the key interlocutor between the West and Muslim actors with whom the West has trouble dealing. This exact dynamic can be seen in Qatar’s recent role in Libya, where it hopes to place itself between Western states and the emerging Islamic government, after cultivating relations with, for example, Ali Al Salabi – one of Libya’s most prominent clerics – for many years. So too can one discern such a relationship with Qatar’s attempts to build and use relations with the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen.

Step towards peace

Overall, while this move is certainly a step towards brokering some kind of peace in Afghanistan, opening up far greater possibilities of meaningful interaction between all sides, it is but the first step along a long and winding road. Qatari facilitation can be exceedingly useful, but it will still take courage on all sides to take the necessary concessionary steps incumbent upon all actors seeking to close violent conflicts.

Published on RUSI.org

Iranian encirclement 12, December 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations, Iran.
Tags: , , , , ,
add a comment

Each star is a US base.

An excellent map from Juan Cole.

On Iran’s Stealth RQ 170 Capture 9, December 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Random.
Tags: , , , , , ,
3 comments

So Iran did actually manage to get a hold of one of America’s drones this time? I would imagine that there are some highly concerned people in Washington and some people buying air tickets and grabbing bags full of cash in Moscow and Beijing.

Iran insists that it remotely jammed the UAV and landed it on purpose. But Iran lies quite a lot about these things. Their technology is, obviously enough , enormously inferior to America’s, but America’s hubris knows no bounds: hence the debacle in Iraq with the feeds from UAVs. Certainly, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Iran hacked the feed and took control of it (their asymmetric warfare capabilities need to be noted as significant, in particular) but it is more likely that either 1) a technical error from the US side caused the issue or 2) Iran managed to scramble the signal somehow. Either which way, these UAVs are designed to land themselves somewhere flat so certainly it didn’t need the Iranians to guide it down.

Certainly, this is a blow for America. How bad a problem remains to be seen in a few years when grainy footage emerges from a Chinese military base of a wing shaped UAV taking off.

Yet such a UAV has such eventualities taken into account; there is some degree of expendability built in.This is not to try to minimize the loss; as Michael Dunn notes, now for one thing Iran will be able to learn exactly what the RQ 170 actually does (i.e. only photography, sigint, radar suppression etc or some combination thereof).

There are, of course, two other possibilities entirely. 1) That Iran has made this out of leftover polystyrene and sticky back plastic or that 2) this is some enormously elaborate sting by America. Neither are that likely, but neither can be ruled out. Let the speculation begin.

British Embassy in Bahrain attacked? 5, December 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Bahrain.
Tags: , ,
add a comment

A small bomb went off near the British Embassy in Bahrain’s capital Manama. The relatively small device went off underneath a bus parked 50 meters away from the Embassy.

Some points to note:

  • This incident comes at a time of tension between the UK and Iran (re: embassy bootings out) and during the Shia festival of Ashura.
  • Nevertheless, without wishing to be fatuous, no one can say with 100% accuracy that the British Embassy was the target. 50m is no small distance. Of course, it is likely, but if you’re that close to the Embassy why not lob it over the wall or leave it next to the wall/gate – anything other that sticking it under a bus?
  • I shudder to think of the hay that the Bahraini authorities will make with this; adding to their already notable molehill of ‘evidence’ of Iranian nefariousness in Bahrain.
  • If the Iranians wanted to attack the British Embassy in Bahrain (or elsewhere) I would suggest that they could – so to speak – do a damn sight better job than a home-made explosive device left under a bus vaguely near a British Embassy.
  • If the Bahraini authorities really want to push this line about this being proof of Iranian influence in Bahrain, then I suggest that this augers for just how little influence they have.
  • If this incident was done by someone with links to or sympathies with Iran (which is, of course, perfectly possible) then this person either: 1) Is incredibly dim (see point 3) in that now the Bahraini authorities will have yet more excuse in their eyes to crack-down further should they so choose. 2) Is rather Machiavellian (see point 3) in that they are trying to draw on more of a repressive response from the Bahraini authorities. Either which way, the Bahraini police ought to pursue a measured response.

Qatar announces elections for 2013 1, November 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.
Tags: , , ,
4 comments

 

Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, in his annual speech to the Shura Council, has announced that Qatar will have elections for a legislative body in 2013. Though the full details of what this entails are not available at present, if this follows the Constitution, 30 of the seats will be elected and 15 will be appointed.

Long time coming

Back in 1995 when the Emir first came to power, elections for the Central Municipal council were promised. This election was to vote in the 29 members of the advisory body attached to the Ministry of Municipality and Agriculture. In late 1997, female suffrage was promised and the election was scheduled for March 1999. Amid high turnout (over 90% in Doha, 70% for the rest of Qatar) no women were elected but Qatar’s first elections with full emancipation – albeit for a consultative role – was a success.

By this stage, other elections had taken place, having taken a lead from the Emir’s enlightened position as espoused in 1995. The Qatari Chamber of Commerce, previously all appointed, was elected by secret ballot of its members in April 1998 and the Assistant Minister of Education noted in 1998 that from then on she would encourage democracy in her fiefdom with the free election of student bodies.

Full general elections for a legislative elected body was expected in 2005 then 2007 again by some in 2010.

Why?

The Emir in Qatar has announced these elections while facing no calls to do so. There is no groundswell of opinion in Qatar demanding democracy. This is a function of the strong socioeconomic position in which Qataris find themselves; the fact that they are, overall, generally pleased and proud to be Qatari, their reputation in recent years having being burnished by their government’s actions in, for example, temporarily solving the bitter Lebanese political crisis in 2008, their continued support of peace in Darfur and their unprecedented actions in Libya; and the fact that Kuwait – the Gulf’s most democratically advanced state – offers an example of how greater democracy in a Gulf context can woefully stifle and retard the efficient progress of government and economics in a country.

Internationally

Qatar has, since its transformation began in the early to mid-1990s, always seen itself as a regional leader. Again without pressure, the Emir abolished the Qatari Information Ministry soon after he came to power; established the revolutionary Al Jazeera TV station; sought to carve out a space for Qatar’s own foreign relations which included shockingly taboo deals with Israel and Iran in the late 1990s especially and generally Qatar eschewed the old, more conservative traditional policies and prodeadures of the Gulf.

This has infuriated its neighbors significantly on numerous occasions. The lack of a Saudi Ambassador in Doha from 2004 to 2008 being one example of severe neighborly displeasure.

More recently, Qatar has – so to speak – calmed down somewhat and reigned in its more egregiously provocative actions. Al Jazeera, for example, has curtailed its vociferous coverage of Saudi Arabia significantly since 2008. Yet this move is likely to antagonise its fellow GCC members. The contrast between a potentially highly democratic Qatar and, for example, Bahrain and especially Saudi Arabia are not going to be comparisons that are appreciated in Manana and Riyadh.

Real powers?

The key caveat here is to note what kind of powers these new Qatari elected officials will have. Again, if the Constitution is followed, then the body will be able to:

  • Approve (not prepare) the national budget
  • Institute votes of no confidence in Ministers
  • Draft, discuss and vote on proposed legislation which will need a 2/3 majoirty and the Emir’s vote to pass

It remains to be seen what will happen in practice. Specifically, it will be interesting to see what kind of deference they show to the Governmental elite. In Kuwait, for example, a certain amount of deference was implicit. Yet ever more the Prime Minister, for example, who was previously untouchable, is the centre of bitter recrimations and attacks.

Initially, it would be logical to expect a certain amount of deference, but this obviously depends upon who is elected. In Kuwait, there are a number of politicians who shamelessly use their positions to grandstand and have brought the machinary of government to a halt over their deeply felt but nevertheless minor issues. While in the public life in Qatar there are certainly a couple of people who will no doubt stand for election and may well be similarly forthright and obstructive, one must not forget that Qatar is a counservative place.  As happened before and though it may sound counterfactual, those whose platforms are overtly political or percieved to be at all reactionary, may well find themselves harshly dealt with by the public vote. A lot of Qataris are of the opinion that ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’, hence their lack of a call for democracy, and could well assert this notion  at the ballot box.

Having said this, there are certainly a number of hot-button issues in Qatar: the educational reforms, the money being spent on Education City and Qatar’s international forays. Though political parties are banned and will likely not be allowed in the near future, there is scope for politicians – many of whom will no doubt come from an Islamic bent – to stand on conservative lines who may attempt to slow down such reforms. Such politicians will have to decide how hard to bang their electoral drum: yes, they need to appeal to voters and to show their stripes, but not too vociferously as to scare off other potential voters.

In sum, this is another fascinating move from a fascinating country. Again Qatar has seized the mantle of leadership in the Arab World and reaffirmed its place as a place of dynamism, of forward-thinking intellect and as unafraid to take some risks.

 

Qataris in Libya: ’100s in every region’ 26, October 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.
Tags: , , , , , ,
add a comment

The Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed forces, Major General Hamad Bin Ali Al Attiya, has confirmed for the first time that Qatar had ’100s of Qataris on the ground [in Libya] in every region.’

While this is something of an open secret having been written about for a long time now (x x), it is interesting to note that it is now confirmed. However, the fact that there were ’100s in every region’ is significantly more than most people thought.

It is likely that these forces were comprised of largely British trained Qatari Special Forces and parts of the Lekhwiya, a quasi-police outfit that does all sorts from, reportedly, training rebels in Libya, handling motorcades in Doha to directing traffic. Both the Lekhwiya and the Special Forces are reputed to be well trained.

In situ, it would be interesting to know if the Qataris were the ones doing the training themselves, or if it was the foreign instructors that trained them. I suppose it must have been a mix. The Qatari Armed Forces as a whole and like most Emirate forces, are small and rely to varying degrees on foreign soldiers within their ranks. Not only to do some of the training but to simply make up the numbers. There are, for example, many Jordanians, Yemenis and Egyptians in the Qatari military. None of these folk, incidentally, received a 120% pay raise the other month unlike their Qatari work-mates.

It is unlikely that this is the start of a new militarism in Qatari foreign policy. Sure, if another opportunity comes up where it is politically and practically feasible for Qatar to send some trainers into a conflict zone, they might do this again. Yet the chances of that do not appear to be good. Syria, for example, is a wholly different kettle of fish. From a vastly different, far smaller geography, to a significantly different political situation vis a vis the rebels and the government, to the fact that it is a critical regional tinder-box, I’d be surprised if any Qataris were rumored to be on the ground there in anything other than exceedingly small numbers, if at all.

London’s Potemkin Protest 25, October 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in UK.
Tags: , ,
2 comments

So while the protestors in London vowed…

Turns out that unless they are lizards, 9/10 bugger off home, no doubt lubed up on a nice Macchiato from Starbucks [cheap shot, I know, I know], to return the next day.

Aside from numerous snide comments that I try to hold back (…I know…) it really irks me that some of these folk dare even hint that their protets are even remotely akin, alike or linked in any way to those in the Arab Spring.

Hat tip

I was most miffed to find that Tim Worstall nicked my headline…or rather he published before me (unless he read my mind, no actual thieving was involved). But still, fair’s fair: thanks.

 

Blowback for Qatar 25, October 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in North Africa, Qatar.
Tags: , , , ,
4 comments

At some stage the adulation and praise that Qatar received was always going to give way to some grumblings of one flavor or another.

Initially, Qatar was praised ad nauseum for their actions:

  • First Arab state (second overall after France) to recognise the TNC
  • Contributed 6 Mirage fighter jets to the NATO no fly zone mission
  • Leading proponent in the GCC and the Arab League of the no-fly zone
  • Sold free Libyan oil on behalf of the rebels
  • Shipped gasoline and other key items to the rebels
  • Shipped tonnes of weapons to the rebels
  • Trained the rebels in Libya and back in Doha
  • Economic aid

The first real signs of griping regarding Qatar’s role [from Libyans: I'm sure the Saudi's were moaning about their 'upstart' neighbour long ago] was last week when Al Tarhouni, Libya’s Oil and Finance Minister pointedly remarked that

To any country, I repeat, please do not give any funds or weapons to any Libyan faction without the approval of the NTC.

This was a clear message to Qatar. Since the start of the conflict, Doha has been funneling arms, money and support to Libya via its contacts there. These included Bejhaj and the Al Salibi brothers. The militias associated with these groups became exceedingly well resourced and thus prospered.Yet now that the fighting is largely over and the TNC are trying to assert their authority and begin the long and slow process of returning Libya to some state of normality, the elite are obviously concerned about cash and weapons potentially still being funneled to one particular faction over another. It is reasonable that they want control over such matters

The second issue is one that has been latent for some months. Moussa Koussa left the UK for Qatar in April. It was becoming far too difficult for him to stay in the UK given his murderous past. Now in Qatar he has, I am sure, proved exceedingly useful to the Qataris and thus indirectly to the NATO alliance in working out who is who in Libya, what Gaddafi is was likely to be up to and where he was most lilely to flee to. Plus a host of other bits and pieces that only long time close confidant of Gaddafi could know. This was the price for his residency in Qatar. Yet now – on the ball as ever – the BBC doorstepped him after after miraculously ‘tracking him down’ to the Four Seasons in Doha (it’s not like it’s been written in numerous articles, or anything x x).

It is likely that there will be a sizable push to bring Koussa to some kind of justice, perhaps in Tripoli, perhaps in the Hague. This will put Qatar in a difficult position, as it will be difficult for Qatar to give up Koussa. Not only would such a notion go against deep-seated notions in this part of the world of hosting a guest (whomever that may be) but Qatar will not want to set a precedent of cow-towing to other powers to hand over someone with whom they have had dealings. Indeed, Qatar sees itself as something of a refuge for various international misfits ranging from one of Saddam Hussein’s wifes  to one of Osama Bin Laden’s sons.

Yet if Qatar does not hand over Koussa as demanded by ‘the Libyan people’ (such a demand is surely not far off) then it risks frittering away the credit that it has built up. Indeed, the TNC’s pointed remarks are already chipping away.

Overall, I don’t really think that Qatar is trying to push its Islamist allies (for that is who most of them are) because they are Islamist per se. I see Qatar’s support of Belhaj et al as mostly a factor of simple connections: they already had relations with Al Salibi and Bejhaj and thus they supported them. Certainly, Qatar is a proud, religious and conservative state and would want to support moderate Islamists, as they are doing, but it is hardly the case that they would refuse to support liberals or someone else. The fact is that if the West is expecting liberals and explicitly non-Islamist candidates to win offices after the Arab Spring, then there will be a lot of disappointed people in London and Washington.

Certainly, Qatar must take into account the TNC’s growing power and their wholly understandable and justified desire to control the weapons going in and out of their country. Yet I also detect a simple pang of jealousy as a motivating factor for the jibes against Qatar. No, I’m not trying to castigate those complaining about Qatar, just point out that it is logical for those without Qatari support to feel irked that someone else is getting truck loads of cash and arms. And if and when such people complain that they are not getting funded because Qatar are funding their own Islamists or some such notion, then I think they are being a bit cheeky and trying to pressure Qatar to stop using the wholly bust Western-created trope and specter of ‘Islamists gaining power’.

This is not to say that Qatar does not have some master plan to push one particular Islamist strand or whatever, just that I don’t know anything about such a plan and it sounds unlike the Qatar that I do know.

As for Koussa, Qatar’s best bet would either be to send him economy class to the Hague now, sticking up for justice and all that, or send him off to some tin-pot African country that wouldn’t care a jot about ICC demands. No, this is not an edifying conclusion, but this is high politics that we’re referring to, after all, not never-never land.

 

 

For the arabists 20, October 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Syria.
Tags: ,
add a comment

Something for the arabists, even part-time, recalcitrant, dopey and forgetful arabists like myself. Translation here.

 

On the Iranian plot 19, October 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Iran, Saudi Arabia.
Tags: ,
add a comment

My published my article on the absurd Iranian plot to kill the KSA Ambassador in Washington DC.

According to local news reports, a loud, indiscreet, rude individual, known for chronic absentmindedness, who has a small-time criminal record and who used to engage in drink, drugs and prostitution is allegedly the key mastermind in what was planned to be the second largest terrorist attack on American soil in history: to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in a Washington DC restaurant.[1]

If the Iranian establishment was behind this plot and was looking for the most unlikely of spies to throw authorities off the scent, then they have clearly succeeded. Yet it is not just the personality of the alleged principal agent that is unconvincing, but the plot as a whole. Worse still, the manner in which the US government has dealt with this alleged plot arguably shows a chronic misunderstanding of not only the Iranian security apparatus but the Iranian threat as a whole

The simple background

Iran has a long and illustrious history in fermenting terrorism abroad. And the Quds Force, part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, is the key international element charged with covertly pushing Iran’s agenda outwith its borders. In recent years, it is believed to have been highly active in Iraq, Afghanistan as well as in Syria and Azerbaijan more recently. Some also claim that it has been involved in stoking troubles in Bahrain, though there is no conclusive evidence of this. It is reasonable to assume that the Quds Force specifically, via its support of specific Taliban elements and of militias in Iraq, is likely to have cost the lives of numerous Americans. Though, again, solid evidence is difficult to come by, it is believed to have been a prime supplier, for example, of advanced roadside explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Abiding and fundamental differences are also manifestly present between Iran and Saudi Arabia. These two entities represent polar opposites in basic religious and political clashes that have been ongoing for over fifteen hundred years and their antithesis is as potent today as it has ever been.

In short, at a basic level, there is scope for believing that ‘Iran’ as a cohesive entity may well engage in just such an act. But such a view eschews all nuance and even a rudimentary understanding of Iran casts serious doubt on the contention that the elite in Iran are somehow behind such a plan.

Nuance

To date, there is scarcely an example of Iran or the Quds Force ever contracting a non-Muslim group with whom they have previously had no dealings whatsoever to carry out an assassination. Considering that this plot would represent the most risky, most difficult and potentially dangerous plot that the Quds Force has ever undertaken, it stretches credulity to suppose that it would have been entrusted to a Mexican drug gang. With no trusted contacts whatsoever in this world, which is reputedly riddled with American agents, it would have been a catastrophic risk to take. While one may argue that the Quds Force were playing on this fact for added deniability, again, the stratospherically high chance of failure and its consequences would surely put paid to any such notions.

Whatever one thinks of the Quds Force, one cannot doubt their unfortunate effectiveness and grim professionalism over the years. Therefore, given what is widely understood about America’s prowess in telecommunication intercepts, it seems irrational, for example, that an otherwise meticulous and professional force would risk discussing their most secretive and audacious mission in history over an open telephone line.

Consequences

Moreover, what would Iran gain from killing the Saudi Arabian Ambassador? Iran’s use of terror tactics in the past has been governed by clear strategic direction. For example, the exporting of IEDs to kill Americans was directly aimed at weakening America in Iraq to hasten their eventual withdrawal.  Yet no such objectives can be divined from this proposed attack. While a cursory pastiche of Iran’s objectives may countenance such an assassination, it simply does not translate into reality.

Some commentators may well argue that the allegations are consistent with Iran’s role as an irrational actor, with its pursuit of asymmetric means, its supposed basis in Shia messianism and its offensive references to Israel: but this is simply not the case. It is a coldly rational state. To offer one simple example: during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, at the very height of Ayatollah’s Khomeini’s rhetorical pomp in the aftermath of the Revolution, Iran merrily traded oil for aircraft spare parts with Israel: rhetoric is one thing, realpolitik is another.

Consider what Iran had to lose. The plan was to kill the Ambassador in a restaurant. Given the types of restaurants that he is likely to frequent, there would surely have been a sizable chance that other high-powered officials (congressmen, senators etc) would have been killed as collateral damage (a chronically important corollary that Arbabsiar – clearly not much of a strategic thinker – summarily dismissed). Such an act would be little less than an act of war.  And for all of Iran’s bluster, it is wholly and supremely aware that in a war with America it could have its army, navy, air force and nuclear facilities, as well as its oil and gas terminals obliterated.

Moreover, the timing of such a would-be attack makes no sense. In an era of ever greater scrutiny of Iran’s human rights record, the pressure will be piled on this weekend when the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Iran will deliver his first report which is ‘expected to excoriate the Iranian government for the treatment of its own citizens’.[2] Furthermore, in early November the IAEA is expected to share information with its board members regarding Iran’s research into fashioning nuclear weapons. The idea that Iran might seek to cause a distraction to detract from these events is plausible, but potentially instigating a war with America would be – to say the least – overkill.

Regionally, it is of little surprise to see Saudi Arabia leaping on the circumstantial evidence offered thus far as yet more proof of Iran’s perfidy. It fits snugly into Riyadh’s narrative which seeks to galvanise other Gulf States and America firmly against Iran and its ways. To be sure, Iran has engaged in all manner of terrorism-supporting activities in the past, some of which have directly affected Saudi Arabia. Yet Saudi Arabia’s latest push for recognition of the Iranian threat – that of Tehran’s support of ferment in Bahrain – while perfectly plausible and in keeping with Iran’s strategic modus operandi and outlook, simply does not have that much evidence backing it up thus far. Instances such as this one – where Iran is lambasted by all levels of the US government as guilty before being charged – further inclines those in power to gloss over other lacunas of evidence (e.g., in Bahrain) under the rubric that Iran ‘is bound’ to be guilty.[3]

As far as the leaders in Riyadh are concerned, they already have a mountain of evidence as to Iran’s intrinsic desire to destroy their country and their system of alliances. This instance will simply be added – prominently – to the pile and will be trotted out as and when required.

One swallow does not a summer make

While one or two Iranians appear to have been seeking to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador – and in his wildest dreams Ahmadinejad too may longingly hope to do something of this nature – it is simply not credible that a professional and experienced organisation such as the Quds Force is behind such an attempt. Nor is it remotely likely that the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei would have sanctioned such a risky, illogical move. It fits neither Iran’s general modus operandi nor does it boost their strategic aims.

The fact that American officials seem to so readily believe this caricature of a poor film script is both worrying and depressing. Indeed, it is not long since disastrous policies were similarly fashioned on the basis of incomplete evidence, sizable simplifications and a lack of a rigorous examination, which led to the gravest of consequences in Iraq. Thankfully in this case it is difficult to find one Iranian or Gulf expert of repute who will do anything other than question the affair as a whole and there is scarcely any appetite for war. Yet America will continue to counter Iran’s many and varied threats ineffectually if it cannot grasp the basic mechanics and motivations in question.

Fundamentally, Iran is governed by an elite that sees itself being encircled by hostile forces. To all points of the compass in Afghanistan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Bahrain, Iraq, Qatar and Kuwait it sees an amassing of American troops not to mention the large-scale sale of the latest US weapons technology to Saudi Arabia and other Iranian neighbours. This is not to mention severe economic domestic difficulties in an age of regional revolutions. Iran cannot hope to react symmetrically and thus puts its efforts to augmenting its asymmetric defences. These include the supporting of Hezbollah and the Quds Force to the development of asymmetric technologies and doctrines, particularly in the Gulf.

Once America’s elite grasps that Iran is reacting out of fear; a genuine and deep-seated fear of change and of regional power realities, perhaps then it can appreciate that while Iran’s politicians feel the need to periodically bang the nationalistic, popular drum, they are nevertheless at pains to avoid egregious provocation with no palpable, tangible rewards: exactly what this absurd plan to kill the Saudi Ambassador would have delivered.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.

NOTES


[1] Steven Kreytak, Local terror plot mastermind described as more a ‘joke’ than a mastermind, statesman.com   http://www.statesman.com/news/local/local-terror-plot-suspect-described-as-more-a-1910853.html

[2] Barbara Slavin ‘Alleged Iranian Assassination Plot Suspicious, Experts Say’ http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=105442

[3] Matthew Lee ‘Clinton: Plot a Dangerous Escalation by Iran’ Washington Post http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/12/us-aims-punish-iran-saudi-envoy-plot/

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 747 other followers