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Best wikileaks summary so far 3, December 2010

Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations.
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Peter Brookes – The Times of London

Cablegate: on reflection 30, November 2010

Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations, Opinion.
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Before analysts get too self-congratulatory about how the cablegate leaks have ‘proven’ how they ‘have been right all along’, there are a few important caveats.

1.       Just because a diplomat said something doesn’t mean it’s true. Ordinarily, one would never have to make such an obvious statement, yet I think that this is being forgotten in this debate. Many of these dispatches are Americans briefing other sections of their diplomatic establishment on, for example, Gulf countries. They therefore espouse the ‘party line’; the image that they [the authors] want the one who is going to x region to carry on.

2.       Yes, diplomats often have very good access. But when one is written by an Ambassador about an interview with a Crown Prince, for example, we must not forget that the Crown Prince in question is not necessarily telling the truth. Again, just because it is meant to be a private ‘off the record’ conversation doesn’t necessarily lend it any more validity. A Crown Prince in the Gulf has a vested interest in deepening and prolonging American support for obvious reasons. What is the best way to do this? By highlighting the Iranian threat and as a key corollary, ‘their’ important on the U.S. side against them too.

3.       The establishment in the Gulf, it must be forgotten, are not necessarily any kind of bell-weather of public opinion at large. They are mostly unelected, after all. While in some instances, I’m sure they do accurately reflect their peoples’ opinions, this must not be taken as a given, as, I think, it often is in this case.

4.       What has been leaked is but a fraction of the whole. There are supposed to be hundreds of thousands more documents to come. As I noted yesterday, Assange picked and chose these pieces of information for a reason. What reason? Publicity, probably, but who knows. Don’t for get this.

These leaks are both fascinating and useful: I don’t want to be too scrooge like about them, but at the same time, I think a brief pause is perhaps necessary to contemplate exactly what they are and where they came from.

 

Qatar in the cablegate relases 29, November 2010

Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations.
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Iran

As with most of the cables, we did not learn anything overly new but had existing suspicious confirmed. Qatar maintains a close relationship with Iran to safeguard its “trillions of dollars of potential wealth”. Nevertheless, the Head of the Army noted that “while we’re neighbours, we’re not friends” and HBJ (the Foreign and Prime Minister) bluntly states that “we lie to them, and they lie to us.”

Regarding Al Udeid, it was noted that the U.S. pays no rent, Qatar funded 60% of the improvements on the base and would not allow it to be used as a base for “kinetic operations” [what a phrase!] against Iran [as the Emir also noted in a recent interview]. Only a “permanent USG security guarantee to Qatar, to include its offshore gas fields shared with Iran” could (perhaps) persuade Qatar to change its position.

U.S. relationship

When U.S. Deputy Secretary thanked HBJ for Qatar’s support for the victims of Hurricane Katrina, he replied that “We might have our own Katrina.” An allusion, it was suggested, regarding potential crises in the Qatar-Iran relationship and the Qatari reciprocal need for support [quid pro Clarisse…etc].

The Head of the Army, to whom the responsibility falls for maintaining a strong U.S. military relationship, complained that Qatar had been “disapproved” of the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system as an add-on to their purchase of c-17s. (It is an automatic counter-missile system). Others in the region had been granted this system.

It is reasonable to assume that this addition was left off specifically for the U.S. to use in a quid-pro-quo. Assistant Secretary of Defence Vershbow, for example, suggests that were Qatar to “bring about a change in Hamas’s behaviour, it could enhance the U.S.–Qatar strategic relationship.”

Qatar’s record on anti-terrorist activity is noted as being conspicuously poor. The NYT records that Qatar is the “worst in the region” in counterterrorism efforts and its security services were “hesitant to act against known terrorist out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals.” Additionally, the leaked (available) cables note that the U.S. is concerned with Qatar’s continuing support of Hamas via charities and the “moral support” that Hamas receives from Al Qaradawi.

This is not the first time that Qatar has been accused by the U.S. in this way. They continually play a tight-rope game between appeasing the U.S. and ‘Islamists’ (for want of a better catch-all phrase). Perhaps they have a similar notional-agreement as was once mooted in Dubai between authorities and ‘Islamists’: ‘use our city for transit or occasional respite, but don’t do anything here’.

Hamas

The Emir believes that Hamas would accept the 1967 border with Israel but cannot currently do so lest they lose popular support. Senator Kerry confirmed that he had heard similar sentiments in Damascus.

HBJ, in another round of the ongoing Egyptian-Qatari tiff, suggested that Egypt has “a vested interest in dragging out Palestinian reconciliation talks for as long as possible.”

Bahrain

The perennially frosty Bahrain-Qatar relations continue. King Hamad voiced annoyance/concern/anger with Qatar on two counts.

Firstly, because of the visit of the Head of the Army to Iran where, he believes, Qatar agreed to too much cooperation with Iran.

Secondly, because Qatar have consistently refused to supply Bahrain with Gas. He claims that Qatar have said that they do not have spare supply but notes new agreements signed with various countries.

I can only assume that this is a simple disagreement over price. Earlier this year Kuwait balked at the price that Qatar wanted for gas. Both expect, I believe, some kind of ‘brotherly’ GCC, wasta-like discount.

King Hamad also suggested that he would like “our brother in Saudi Arabia to send a note telling Qatar not to play like this [re: Iran].” This suggests that Hamad has a rather longingly antiquated view of the Qatar-Saudi Arabian relationship.

Food security

The Embassy in Doha judges that food security is “a key national priority” for Qatar and a growing one for the Arab region. (Perhaps a summation of interest to those with an interest in the ‘widening’ security debate.)

Kyrgyzstan

One of my favorites so far:

In a conversation between the U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Bishkek over the topic of the Chinese seeking to offer inducements to prompt the Kyrgyz authorities to not renew the Manas Base, one cable reports that:

Very uncharacteristically, the silent young [Chinese] aide then jumped in: Or maybe you [Americans] should give them $5 billion and buy both us and the Russians out.” The aide then withered under the Ambassadors’ horrified stare.

What a curious outburst. Here’s hoping that he’s not been reassigned to a post in the middle of the Gobi desert.