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MEI blog & the Sins of Middle Eastern Scholarship 21, May 2009

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I’ve followed Michael Collins Dunn over at the Middle East Institutes’s blog since its beginning in January this year. Overall, it is one of the best blogs on Middle Eastern affairs. It is a selection of educated and manifestly knowledgeable ruminations of various aspects of Middle Eastern politics and international relations in the broadest sense. To my mind, the best post so far is, in fact, a link that Dunn posted in April to a blog by Professor of Political Science, Eric Davis. This post is entitled “10 Conceptual Sins” in Analyzing Middle East Politics” gives a critical and insightful run-down of the grave errors that are made by Western scholars when looking at and analyzing the Middle East. As Dunn beseeches his readers, you really ought to read the article if you’ve got any interest in ME IR at all. Below is a brief recapitulation of Davis’ ‘sins‘ and a word or two, usually taken from his text, briefly explaining them.

Sin # 1: “Presentism.” – Not “taking history seriously” and believing in stereotypes to a large degree.

Sin # 2: Overemphasizing the ethnic and confessional identities, the “ethnoconfessional model.”

Sin # 3: The idea of a “communal mind.” – “If a political scientist from Iraq, Egypt, Iran or any other Muslim country in the Middle East were to come to the United States and assert that, if s/he knew the ethnic, racial or religious background of an American, s/he could tell us what that person’s ideology and political beliefs were, Americans would find such a notion ludicrous, to say the least. Yet many analysts of Middle East politics base their assessments of the region’s political dynamics on the social background of the political leader or activist in question.”

Sin # 4: The excessive focus on elites

Sin #5: The myth of “Islamic fundamentalism.” – “the notion of a radical Islam at the root of much if not all of the Middle East’s problems is pervasive in the Western media.”

Sin #6: Seeing the Middle East politics through binary thinking. –  For example, “the Council of Guardians in Iran, led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad constitute a set of unsavory political leaders, to put it mildly. Nevertheless, as many public opinion polls have demonstrated, Iranians by and large are very supportive of democracy, especially the educated middle classes.

Sin #7: Failure to learn the history, language and cultures of the region. –  For example, “would we take seriously a correspondent who was bureau chief in Washington, DC, for a major daily newspaper in Iran, the Arab countries, Turkey, or Israel if s/he did not speak English?”

Sin #8: The failure to consider political economy – For example,  “the percentage of young people under the age of 25 is as high as 60% in countries such as Iraq and Iran, and a very large percentage of them are unemployed or under employed.”

Sin #9: Failure to account for exogenous influences and “neighborhood effects’” on the region’s politics.

Sin # 10: Why can’t they be like us?

….

Dunn comments on several of the sins here, here and here.


The Chinese media reaction to the Darfur crisis – caught between the old and the new 25, February 2008

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The Chinese media reaction to the Darfur crisis – caught between the old and the new.

The Chinese reaction to the criticism of their Sudanese policies has varied widely. Liu Guijin the Chinese special envoy to Africa spoke eloquently to journalists in London last week. In excellent English, he calmly and coherently made the Chinese case. China was indeed trying to help in Darfur through various meetings and other mediums. China only supplies some 8% of the weapons to Sudan, he claimed, and professed confusion as to how stories exaggerating China’s arms exporting deals come about. “Is it a misunderstanding or is it intentional?” he mused. However, he reiterated the fundamental plank of Chinese foreign policy being non-intervention and was clear that China would only go so far in terms of persuasion. This particular example is similar to the Chinese response in front of the Western media as a whole: professional and slick.

This is in stark contrast to the Chinese domestic response to the same crisis, even in the English language news in China. Take Xinhua for example, the Governmental mouth piece. To choose two of their stories covering Sudan and China, one was titled “Sudan’s FM lauds China’s role in solving Darfur issue.” At a press conference with Liu Guikin the Sudanese foreign minister gave a statement as if it was written for him by the Chinese:

“China is using its good relations with Sudan to help it solve the Darfur issue…China is not here to help Sudan in a way that will prompt the Darfur conflict to continue. China is here to help Sudan in issues regarding economic developments. China is here to help build Sudan, and China is engaged in business not only in the oil sector, but also other sector…[Commenting on some Western organizations’ threat to boycott the Beijing Olympic Games] What they should do is to solve the Darfur issue in a right direction, instead of putting more pressure on China.”

It seems that the Sudanese English language newspapers were equally on message, as quoted in Xinhua:

Sudan Vision, the largest English-language daily in terms of circulation, ran an editorial in both English and Chinese, the first of its kind by a newspaper in Sudan.

“Indeed, Chinese leadership and media refused to trail behind Western fabrications on Darfur, and have instead firmly stood in the face of pressures put on it because it is fully aware of Western attempts to capitalize on the African problem to pass its own agendas which did not change since the colonial era,” the independent daily said in the editorial.

“We have every right to mock at the flawed voices attempting tolink the Olympic Games China will host to the Darfur problem. Such cheap attempt will not affect the eligibility of China for hosting this international activity in the best manner,” the editorial said.

“We, too, appreciate China’s repeated call for political dialogue to resolve the Darfur issue, contrary to Western pressures on Sudan,” it said.

“But the way Western countries dealt with the issue, providing Darfur rebels with funds, weapons and political support, made the rebels reluctant to reach peace. Not only that, the West has continued to use rebels as pawn to achieve its target,” said the editorial.

 

Such flagrant bias would simply not be tolerated in Western media. Indeed, it would surely be treated with the scorn and contempt that it deserves. What is more puzzling is that China appears to realise this, at least to some extent. You don’t see them peddling this kind of insipid and transparent dialogue in the West, not that they could find (one would hope) a Western newspaper to promulgate Beijing’s line in such an obsequious manner.

Victor Mallet of the Financial Times recently wrote an interesting piece tangential to this theme. He suggested that Beijing ought to open up its media to a greater extent, to allow Chinese people to decide the pros and cons for themselves. Then, “its officials and citizens would be better prepared for the onslaught of criticism and political activism likely to be directed at Beijing’s domestic and foreign policies ahead of the Olympic Games.”

Beijing’s cautious, simplistic and anachronistic assumption that such sycophantic reporting is the safer way to proceed to minimise protest and disharmony is sure to backfire.

Firstly, if people do indeed believe such stories in their entirety then, as Mallet points out, they will be shocked and none too happy with the Western media coverage of events in the lead up to the Olympics. This will create a feeling that the Western media and thus the West are unjustly attacking China just as it is about to take centre stage in one of the most significant events in its recent history. Again, one must not underestimate the importance of the Olympics to the Chinese, in terms of the pride with which they take in hosting it and the prestige that they believe will bestowed on China because of it.

Secondly, for those who read such reports with a wry and rueful smile, the Chinese government are doing themselves no favours. Such reporting suggests gullibility on the part of the reader: not a nice assumption to be fostered upon anyone. Disenfranchising swathes of citizens (and it is surely swathes: most people don’t really take these reports seriously?) will only push them to seek more sources of news, something which the Government seeks to keep under control.

Overall, such reports smack of the old days; of absurd communist pre-Perestroika press or even of Comical Ali, where press reporting was decidedly more fiction than fact. And, to reiterate, the Chinese know better: they show that they do in their modern, fluent and professional Western media interviews. They must not think that they can keep – á la King Canute – the tide of free press and free discussion away from their citizens, it is simply not feasible and, in the long run, not advantageous.

 

Cartoons from the Middle East 16, February 2008

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 akhbar al arab uae 14.2.08 pol game in leb

The political game in Lebanon

Akhbar Al Arab, UAE

14.02.08

IN lEB

The explosive situation in Lebanon

Al Bayeb, UAE

12.02.08

Iranian, Israeli and American relations 15, February 2008

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Iran, Western-Muslim Relations.
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The University of Berkeley, California has a useful series of interviews with various people of various persuasions discussing various aspects of international relations and politics.

In this video, Trita Parsi, the Director of the National Iranian American Council discusses the surprisingly close relations between Israel and Iran over the past two decades.

The Beijing Olympics and China’s evolving foreign policy 14, February 2008

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A recent article in Foreign Affairs suggests that China is modifying its foreign policy. “Over the last two years, Beijing has been quietly overhauling its policies towards pariah states” the authors claim. They then proceed to make a very convincing case almost to the contrary of this statement. Indeed, their evidence at best suggests that China is improving its foreign policy image, without substantial changes in the nuts and bolts. Furthermore, what their ample and well researched evidence suggests to me is that Beijing is being as pragmatic as ever in the pursuit of its foreign policy.

China’s dealings with pariah states are well known. It has intimate relations with despotic North Korea, racist Zimbabwe, genocidal Sudan and terrorist-propagating Iran, to name but a few. The article, however, suggests that there is evidence that in recent times China has been playing a much more forceful hand towards these states, especially when they have fallen under international pressure. They cite many instances of China’s apparent change of foreign policy in recent years.

Regarding North Korea, amongst various other Chinese policies, the authors praise Beijing’s crucial role in forcing North Korea to the negotiating table in 2003. The singing of the UNSC resolution 1696 demanding Iranian suspension of their Uranium enrichment programme is seen – rightly – as a change in step by China. The important role of various Chinese ministers and special envoys in getting Sudan to accept foreign troops in Darfur is also a worthy argument, auguring towards a potential change in Chinese foreign policy. Also, the authors suggest that there has been a distinct cooling in Sino-Zimbabwean relations, despite the lack of significant international pressure, suggesting that China might have proceeded with this change in policy for internal reasons i.e. their overall change in foreign policy.

However, as the authors point out themselves, at every stage of these apparent changes, there were wholly pragmatic reasons for the Chinese to do so. The authors, however, do not fully appreciate explore this reasoning. In the example of Zimbabwe, with the economy plummeting and inflation rising as they have been for some time now, any Chinese investment was simply not seeing any real return. Thus, the cooling of relations between these countries is not, I would suggest, primarily because of Chinese human rights concerns, but simply motivated by basic economics: why would they invest heavily in a country with either poor or no return? The examples of Sudan and Iran can be explained by China’s increased vulnerability to international pressure, for the next year at least. It is difficult to underestimate the importance that the Olympics has for China. Whilst there are a significant number of people in the UK who are generally apathetic or even hostile to the London 2012 Olympics, people in China tend see this as an opportunity to extol China’s virtues after its century of humiliation. Indeed, as for back as 2003 there were Olympic t-shirts abounding in the markets of every Chinese town and Chinese people, when they stopped you in the street to talk (a daily occurrence), would frequently chat about the Olympics. It really is taking on a different level of importance in China. Thus, any notion that it might be branded the Genocide Olympics is a serious political concern for China. It genuinely seems likely that China would modify its international politics to some degree in order attempt to preempt or assuage the most vociferous anti-China voices and protect their Olympics from ridicule, protests and marginalisation.

These are only hypotheses. However, these are the simplest and to my mind the best explanation for China’s minor changes in foreign policy in recent years. They are an ultimately rational and pragmatic actor. When the benefits of interaction outweigh international displeasure, then China will ignore international displeasure and trade with the countries in question. However, if and when this calculation shifts – as it has done when the Beijing Olympics are considered – so does the Chinese position.

 
 

Tajikistan pin their colours to the Chinese mast 6, February 2008

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The Tajik government has spoken out vehemently against Taiwan’s planned referendum on UN membership. Here are excerpts of the statement released by the foreign ministry:

“Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China…Tajikistan adheres to the one-China policy, and supports China’s efforts to pursue peaceful reunification and safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity…and it is also opposed to Taiwan’s attempt to join any international and regional organizations, to which only sovereign states are entitled.”

Quite strong stuff. Who will take a bet that Tajikistan have just or are about to seek/receive Chinese investment or aid in some way shape or form? Anyone….

 

Iran complain about France’s colonial outpost in the UAE 3, February 2008

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Iran has made a formal complaint to the French Ambassador in Tehran about France’s recent announcement that they will soon set up a military base in the UAE. Tehran accuse the French of adopting an ‘unfriendly position’ towards Iran by agreeing to station troops across the Persian Gulf, and – for once – Iran do seen to have a logical case. Indeed, it is somewhat difficult to see what the French are actually getting out of running this base in the UAE. There appear to be few – if any – tangible returns for them. France do have significant historical links with the Emirates so perhaps they are defending their influence there with the acquisition of the base. However, it seems somewhat unlikely that the French would go to the significant trouble of setting up and manning a base in the Persian Gulf just for ‘old time’s sake’. Thus, the French appear to have acquired this base solely as a badge of international prestige, promoting the (erroneous) notion that they are still a ‘world’ power who can influence actors in a contested and crucial corner of the world.

As far as Iran is concerned, having a new foreign and somewhat hostile power (with a significant and brutal colonial history) barely 250km from their mainland is a disturbing prospect. This can surely only reinforce Iran’s feelings of isolation vis-à-vis the Western world. Whilst the analogy of the Cuban Missile Crisis does not fit exactly* to this situation, it is nevertheless somewhat instructive in terms of explaining the reaction of a state to the stationing of an unfriendly military presence close to home soil. To put this another way – how happy would France be if Iran suddenly set up a military base a couple of hundred kilometres from Marseilles under some flimsy pretext, seemingly with the sole aim of pressurising French actions?

Iran’s angry reaction is not only understandable but just. Whilst France would not (I can only imagine) engage in reckless military activities in the Straits, their presence alone in the area is simply one more complicating and pressurising factor that an already potentially combustible region could really do without.

* Whilst France are a nuclear power, surely they will not base their missiles in the UAE base? Thus, one of the key dynamics of the Cuban Missile Crisis is not there, at least until (if) Iran acquire their own weapons. Additionally, the level hostility between France and Iran is significantly lower than it was between America and the USSR/Cuba at the time of the crisis.

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/02/03/45105.html

 

Further signs of an Iranian regional rapprochement 1, February 2008

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Foreign Policies, Iran, Middle East.
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It was suggested in an article earlier this week (‘Iran Threatens Reprisals’ 30th January) that Iran appeared to be softening its stance towards its regional neighbours. In that particular case it was Iran apparently relinquishing its previously asserted aim that countries which harboured US bases would themselves be attacked if the US launched an attack against Iran from those bases. Thus, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain – all with large US bases – would have been pleased to hear such an apparent change in policy, even if Iran retaliating against their countries was an unlikely prospect.

Additionally, in the past few months, there have been various signs of Iran edging towards a formal rapprochement with Egypt, which lends more and more credibility to the thesis suggesting that Iran are seeking to lower intra-regional tensions.

Iran broke off relations with Egypt after their involvement in the Camp David peace accords in 1978, during which Egypt negotiated with Israel. Iran saw this as a sign of betrayal and the two countries’ relations were further damaged for the coming decades when Anwar Sadat granted the deposed Shah of Iran refuge following the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

In the last few months, however, there have been a number of ministerial meetings signalling a thaw in relations. In December 2007, Ali Larjani the Iranian National Security Chief met with President Mubarak for discussions. This past week the speaker of the Iranian Parliament Gholam Ali Adel visited Cairo for a two day meeting orchestrated by the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). This visit followed quickly on the heels of Iran’s Director General for foreign policy for the Middle Eastern and North African affairs, who was in Cairo on Sunday to discuss the Palestinian refugee situation with Egypt’s foreign minister. Indeed, the very next day the Iranian foreign minister announced that Iran and Egypt are close to re-establishing diplomatic links.

Iran, therefore, are mending their fences in the region, not only with Egypt but with other countries such as Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Ahmadinejad’s visit to Mecca and invitation to the GCC meeting in Doha are proof, if it were needed, that Iran’s policy shift is bearing fruit. Furthermore, Iran are seeking to make friends and influence people further a field in China and Central Asia. Hence their (as yet unsuccessful) lobbying to be included in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The ultimate goal of these foreign policy forays is to offset American and European attempts to isolate Iran and they seem to be doing a good job at it so far. This means that any American and European attempts to pressure Iran need to take into account these constantly evolving international relationships. Any kind of blanket or insufficiently nuanced strategy could well backfire in the long run. Indeed, according to Harvard political scientist Samantha Power, current US policies do not appear to have such as level of flexibility and understanding. One can only hope that, assuming the Bush administration is not going to revamp its policies in its twilight months, the new American administration, which ever it may be, can bring with them fresh but educated ideas of how to interact with Iran.

Iran threatens reprisals 30, January 2008

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The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, General Mohammad Ali Jaafari, has told Al Jazeera that Iran will  retaliate against American bases in the region if they are used in an attack against Iran. This, obviously, does not even need to be stated – of course Iran would attack these bases. Thus perhaps the reason that this statement has come out now is in light of the recent French acquisition of a military base in the UAE, less than 250km from the Iranian mainland. Then again, this could simply be the Iranians gently rattling their sabre as they are wont to do.

Interestingly, in this statement the General said that Iran would specifically try to only attack the American bases and not retaliate against the Arab hosts. This is a change in policy. Previously, Iran made bellicose remarks about how states that hosted US troops – Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar – could be attacked as part of Iranian reprisals, were they themselves to be attacked. This, if indeed it is a firm shift in policy, would be a welcome relief for the countries in the region and could signal Tehran’s desire to defuse regional tension.