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QIA Investment Stratagy – Wikileaks 12, July 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.
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I’ve just stumbled upon, once more, Wikileaks’ treasure-trove of interesting bits and pieces. In addition to HBJ voicing his concern over the security situation in Yemen and the Qataris noting that they doubt that their electricity infrastructure could cope with a nuclear reactor in Qatar, there was also an interesting conversation related by the American Ambassador after a member of the Qatar Investment Authority’s executive board, Dr Hussain Al Abdulla.

While there was nothing new in the conversation to those that pay attention to these things, it was pleasing to see the policies codified in black and white.

  • An interest in ‘any commodities’ – gold, silver, oil, gas, agricultural products. This was based on a belief that there are long-term structural changes afoot in these markets suggesting price increases.
  • Business acquisition.  QIA is “not interested in distressed assets or distressed debt. We are interested in distressed sellers.”
  • Real estate in US and Europe, not Asia.
  • Beginning to invest in South America – particularly in agriculture.

Regarding QIA’s various vehicles, again, there was nothing new to see, but a brief summary-

  • QIA itself as an investment company for established enterprises
  • Diar (wholly QIA owned) focussed on development projects
  • Barwa – owned by QIA, to be privatised at some date
  • National Hotel Corporation – owned by QIA, to be privatised at some date

Qatar ‘strengthens security’ with Iran & America 5, January 2011

Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations, Iran, Qatar.
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Qatar likes to try to assure its security on all fronts. Hence friendly visits to Iran and extra security agreements with America.

The Emir recently visited Iran becoming the first Arab leader to do so since the release of the Wikileaks diplomatic cables. Presumably he didn’t discuss how the two countries routinely “lie to each other” or any other such embarrassing revelations. Instead – you guessed it – emphasis was placed on the “brotherly and excellent” relations between Qatar and Iran, while Ahmadinejad parroted back something to do with harmony, stability and security.

I sometimes feel that there must be a simple machine that churns out these asinine comments, much like this Daily Mail headline creator.

…

In related news, Qatar recently signed a security document with the US for dealing with exchanging information about terrorists and other similar security-related matters. Again, in the wake of the Wikileaks revelations which place Qatar squarely last in the region for counterterrorism cooperation, unless this is a direct answer to those accusations, which seems is unlikely, I’d say that this visit and signing ceremony is about as much concrete use as the Iranian one.

Qatar in the cablegate relases 29, November 2010

Posted by thegulfblog.com in American ME Relations.
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Iran

As with most of the cables, we did not learn anything overly new but had existing suspicious confirmed. Qatar maintains a close relationship with Iran to safeguard its “trillions of dollars of potential wealth”. Nevertheless, the Head of the Army noted that “while we’re neighbours, we’re not friends” and HBJ (the Foreign and Prime Minister) bluntly states that “we lie to them, and they lie to us.”

Regarding Al Udeid, it was noted that the U.S. pays no rent, Qatar funded 60% of the improvements on the base and would not allow it to be used as a base for “kinetic operations” [what a phrase!] against Iran [as the Emir also noted in a recent interview]. Only a “permanent USG security guarantee to Qatar, to include its offshore gas fields shared with Iran” could (perhaps) persuade Qatar to change its position.

U.S. relationship

When U.S. Deputy Secretary thanked HBJ for Qatar’s support for the victims of Hurricane Katrina, he replied that “We might have our own Katrina.” An allusion, it was suggested, regarding potential crises in the Qatar-Iran relationship and the Qatari reciprocal need for support [quid pro Clarisse…etc].

The Head of the Army, to whom the responsibility falls for maintaining a strong U.S. military relationship, complained that Qatar had been “disapproved” of the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system as an add-on to their purchase of c-17s. (It is an automatic counter-missile system). Others in the region had been granted this system.

It is reasonable to assume that this addition was left off specifically for the U.S. to use in a quid-pro-quo. Assistant Secretary of Defence Vershbow, for example, suggests that were Qatar to “bring about a change in Hamas’s behaviour, it could enhance the U.S.–Qatar strategic relationship.”

Qatar’s record on anti-terrorist activity is noted as being conspicuously poor. The NYT records that Qatar is the “worst in the region” in counterterrorism efforts and its security services were “hesitant to act against known terrorist out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals.” Additionally, the leaked (available) cables note that the U.S. is concerned with Qatar’s continuing support of Hamas via charities and the “moral support” that Hamas receives from Al Qaradawi.

This is not the first time that Qatar has been accused by the U.S. in this way. They continually play a tight-rope game between appeasing the U.S. and ‘Islamists’ (for want of a better catch-all phrase). Perhaps they have a similar notional-agreement as was once mooted in Dubai between authorities and ‘Islamists’: ‘use our city for transit or occasional respite, but don’t do anything here’.

Hamas

The Emir believes that Hamas would accept the 1967 border with Israel but cannot currently do so lest they lose popular support. Senator Kerry confirmed that he had heard similar sentiments in Damascus.

HBJ, in another round of the ongoing Egyptian-Qatari tiff, suggested that Egypt has “a vested interest in dragging out Palestinian reconciliation talks for as long as possible.”

Bahrain

The perennially frosty Bahrain-Qatar relations continue. King Hamad voiced annoyance/concern/anger with Qatar on two counts.

Firstly, because of the visit of the Head of the Army to Iran where, he believes, Qatar agreed to too much cooperation with Iran.

Secondly, because Qatar have consistently refused to supply Bahrain with Gas. He claims that Qatar have said that they do not have spare supply but notes new agreements signed with various countries.

I can only assume that this is a simple disagreement over price. Earlier this year Kuwait balked at the price that Qatar wanted for gas. Both expect, I believe, some kind of ‘brotherly’ GCC, wasta-like discount.

King Hamad also suggested that he would like “our brother in Saudi Arabia to send a note telling Qatar not to play like this [re: Iran].” This suggests that Hamad has a rather longingly antiquated view of the Qatar-Saudi Arabian relationship.

Food security

The Embassy in Doha judges that food security is “a key national priority” for Qatar and a growing one for the Arab region. (Perhaps a summation of interest to those with an interest in the ‘widening’ security debate.)

Kyrgyzstan

One of my favorites so far:

In a conversation between the U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Bishkek over the topic of the Chinese seeking to offer inducements to prompt the Kyrgyz authorities to not renew the Manas Base, one cable reports that:

Very uncharacteristically, the silent young [Chinese] aide then jumped in: Or maybe you [Americans] should give them $5 billion and buy both us and the Russians out.” The aide then withered under the Ambassadors’ horrified stare.

What a curious outburst. Here’s hoping that he’s not been reassigned to a post in the middle of the Gobi desert.