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Iran and Shiism: A misunderstood relationship 28, April 2009

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As usual there’s an excellent article over at the Middle East Institute’s blog, this time discussing the false association of Shiism with Iran. The article concisely explains that its roots are “as Arab as Sunnism” and that it is only since the 16th century or so when the ruling Safavids adopted Shiism that a closer association began. This Shia-Iran nexus was, of course, further entrenched with the 1979 revolution which began to pyrolyze across the region, worrying Sunni powers.

One of the most interesting aspects of this is the belief from the Sunni minority in Iraq (and who knows how many other people) that because the majority of Iraq’s population is Shia that they will somehow ‘side’ or be overly sympathetic towards Iran. This, as I have written about before, is just not the case. The MEI article adds another dimension to what I previously wrote and lends strength to the overall argument.

Backgrounder: Some Thoughts on Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘ism and Misperceptions

The attacks on the shrine of Al-Qazimiyya in Baghdad on Friday and on other Shi‘ite targets on Thursday and Friday threaten a renewal of sectarian conflict, as I noted at the time, but also spur me to talk a little about the role of Shi‘ism in Iraq, which is often misunderstood.

One fundamental misunderstanding is the idea that Shi‘ism is somehow intrinsically “Persian,” because of its contemporary association with Iran. Misunderstood by whom? I can think of at least three major groups:

  1. Westerners who know enough about Islam to understand the differences between Sunni and Shi‘a, but who have a fairly superficial knowledge;
  2. Most Sunni Arabs, at least those from countries without a large Shi‘ite population;
  3. Most Iranian Shi‘a.

The last one may be a bit unfair, and the second needs to be qualified, as it is above, to note that Sunnis from countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain or Kuwait usually have a more sophisticated understanding of Shi‘ism. But this is not just a rhetorical point: Shi‘ites in largely Sunni countries are sometimes portrayed as a pro-Iranian fifth column because of this misperception.

Shi‘ism was, in its origins, as Arab as Sunnism. It was born in Medina, nurtured in Kufa and had its great martyrdom on the field of Karbala’.

Of the 12 Imams of Twelver Shi‘ism, only one, ‘Ali al-Rida (‘Ali Reza), the eighth Imam, is buried in Iran (at Mashhad). The twelfth Imam disappeared in Iraq, and the other ten Imams are buried in Saudi Arabia or Iraq: ‘Ali, the central figure of Shi‘ism, is buried in Najaf, Iraq; Hasan, the second Imam, is buried in Medina; Husayn, the third, is buried where he fell at Karbala’ in Iraq; the fourth, ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin, is buried in Medina, while the fifth and sixth are also buried in Medina; the seventh and ninth are buried at the Qazimiyya shrine attacked last Friday in Baghdad; the tenth and eleventh are buried in the al-‘Askari shrine in Samarra’ (blown up in 2006, starting a wave of sectarian killing); the twelfth disappeared in Samarra’ as well.

The reason there were so many Iranian pilgrims killed in the attacks in Iraq (leading Iran to blame them on the US and Israel, though clearly Sunni radicals were responsible) is that most of the major shrine mosques of Shi‘ism are in Iraq, final resting place for six of the twelve Imams.

The close identification of Iran with Shi‘ism really only dates from the 16th century, when Safavid Iran officially adopted Twelver Shi‘ism as its faith. While there had been earlier Shi‘ite dynasties there, Shi‘ite dynasties of one kind or another flourished in many Arab countries. Cairo’s ancient Fatimid gate, the Bab al-Nasr, even has an inscription reading “There is no God gut God; Muhammad is the Prophet of God and ‘Ali is the wali of God,” the Shi‘ite formulation of the Muslim shahada. (The Fatimids, though, were Isma‘ili Shi‘ites, not the Twelver variety found in Iran, Iraq, etc.)

Until Saddam Hussein began really cracking down on the Shi‘ite clerical establishment during the Iran-Iraq war (again, the suspicion of Shi‘ites as a fifth column), Najaf was the most important scholarly center for Shi‘ite theology; it was where the Ayatollah Khomeni himself taught in exile from Iran. With the Iranian Revolution and Saddam’s crackdowns, the importance of Najaf declined and Qom, Mashhad, and other Iranian clerical schools became suppliers of clerics to Shi&lsquites in other countries; with that came some genuine Iranian influence (such as with Hizbullah in Lebanon), but most Arab Shi‘ites are Arabic-speakers, not Persian-speakers.

As I said though, many Sunnis assume Arab Shi‘ites are somehow more Persian than they are, and many Iranians are surprised when Arab Shi‘ites do not avidly follow the Iranian model of clerical rule. Iraqi Shi‘ites rightly and proudly consider their country the seedbed of Shi‘ite Islam.

Al Qaradawi reaching out to Shia 13, March 2009

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Media in the ME, Middle East.
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Here are some intelligent thoughts from Arabic Media Shack on Al Qaradawi and his apparent desire to try to reach out some kind of olive branch to Shia Muslims.

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi today issued a statement that’s sort of favorable to Iran.  Seems to me that there is some kind of attempt to improve relations between Al-Qaradawi and the Shia and part of its playing out on a new focus at Islam Online (his extremely widely read site).   Previously, there was a very noticeable lack of coverage of the Shia in the Islamist movements section.   Put it this way: if your site is called Islam Online and you don’t feature any coverage of the Shia I can see how the averge Shia might wonder “Gee, is there some kind of subtle message here?”    Over the past week, however,  there has been a sudden explosion of Shia coverage.  Since I first mentioned this two days, another article appeared on Iran and then this one on the Shia_in_Kuwait.  What other explanation for this sudden interest in the Shia is there than an attempt to repair relations?

The New Statesman’s atrocious editing 11, March 2009

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wrong-middle-east-map

“Sunni v Shia”  Zaki Chehad New Statesman (17th February 2007)

(Red= Shia majority. Yellow=Sunni majority)

Notice anything strange about this map? Anything at all? I’ll give you a clue, there are three mistakes: two are cartographic and one is to do with an over-zealous graphic editor.

Firstly, whilst Iran and Iraq certainly are countries with a Shia majority, Kuwait is not. The Shia are thought to be around a third of the population. Not even especially close to a majority.

Secondly, Bahrain has been inflated in size as well as having its actual outline changed. Bahrain is relatively long and thin, resembling perhaps a dagger. Also it is on a north-south axis as opposed to this squashed, stunted Bahrain on an east-west axis. On this map, it is vastly over-exaggerated in size, appearing half the size of Qatar (should be 17 times smaller) and maybe 4 times smaller than Kuwait (should be 27 times smaller).

Thirdly, and in my view the worst mistake is to do with Qatar. On the New Statesman’s map Qatar is clearly and unequivocally an island. It is not. It is contiguous to the Arabian Peninsula land mass, having, at its narrowest, a 25 mile border with Saudi Arabia.

I can understand, to some degree, the Bahrain mistake. They want to highlight that Bahrain has a Shia majority and if they had a map of the Middle East’s true dimensions, Bahrain would hardly be visible. There are, however, better ways around this than simply re-drawing the country. Or if you insist on getting all imperial and re-drawing the country, then at least put a note on the map saying so. The Kuwait example is simply poor editing. The graphic artist (whom I sincerely hope is out of a job now) either mis-read his instructions or simply didn’t care enough. It is the Qatar example that seems to be the worst to me, for the person in question would have had to have taken some map to edit. This means that they wantonly erased Qatar (for some unknown reason) and drew it back in as an island. This, to me, shows an utter contempt for detail and a profound lack of professionalism as well as crass, sloppy and lazy editing.

The strength of Middle East nationalism as a search for legitimacy 27, February 2009

Posted by thegulfblog.com in Bahrain, Foreign Policies, Iran, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East, Saudi Arabia.
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Since Napoleon raised his army on a diet of nationalistic fervour, flags and anthems, people in the West have been only too aware of the powerful nature of nationalism. This is not to say that it is not powerful elsewhere. However, from a Western perspective, since Western states have – on the whole – been established, bordered and Weshphalian entities for longer than elsewhere in the world, there is, it could be suggested, something of an implicit assumption that nationalism could be ipso facto stronger in the West. In the Middle East, for example, how could the forces of nationalism possibly be that strong, one might think, in such young states (some of which only became independent in 1971) where there is such a manifestly important and pervasive uniting element at the supra-national level in Islam?

Whatever the apparent logic of such a position, it is clearly wrong: nationalism in the Middle East is thoroughly entrenched and all too visible. During the Iraq-Iran war, many on the Iranian side expected that their Shia brethren in the Iraqi army (and the vast majority in the country) might switch sides to the Iranians or at least not fight. Eight years of bitter, attritional and epically costly warfare later and such notions were thoroughly disabused. In a talk given at Durham University, the Iraqi Ambassador to America echoed these sentiments when discussing Shia in power in Baghdad today: they did and do not ‘sell out’ Iraq to Iran in any way, shape or form, act as Iranian stooges or even fail to drive a hard bargain where necessary. They were Iraqi first and Shia second.

Exactly the same logic has been apparent in Bahrain recently. Bahrain, like Iraq under Saddam, is mostly Shia but ruled by a Sunni minority. In the Bahraini case the country is approximately 2/3 Shia. There have always been exceedingly close ties with Persia/Iran but some 230KM away. Indeed, the ruling al Khalifah family have always feared the closeness of Iran and their history of overlordship. Their fears are not eased by periodic hawkish remarks from various Iranian parliamentarians, such as last week’s comments by Ali Akber Nateq Nouri the speaker of Iran’s parliament bemoaning that Bahrain used to be the 14th province of Iran. Far from inciting his Shia, Farsi-speaking former country-men in Bahrain to stand up against the Sunni minority (whether that was what he was intending or not) such actions created a vociferous nationalist reaction and general opprobrium.

“Three Arab summits in response to the Gaza offensive.”

3-conferences-for-gaza-peaceAl-Quds Al-Arabi, London, January 17, 2009 (MEMRI)

The manifest strength of nationalism in the Middle East is one of the reasons that, despite most of the region having a common language, an over-achingly common religion, a common enemy in Israel, a common cause in the Palestinian situation and common social, cultural and political histories, so many divisions emerge when trying to come together over a given issue. The most recent example of this was in the establishment of conferences to deal with the Israeli invasion of Gaza: one involving Qatar, Iran and Syria, another with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and a third in Kuwait. As Gregory Gause writes, however, these divisions are nothing new and indeed were even more divisive in the recent past.

It could be argued that the desire for each Arab country to be seen as ‘fixer in chief’ stems from their inherent lack of democratic legitimacy. Without a popular mandate, leaders have to justify their positions in a different way. Acting as a leading country in the region, one that is standing up to Israel or assiduously helping the Palestinians, is all currency that may help fill the democratic void.